The University of Chicago

PROBLEMS OF PERSONALITY TRAITS, WITH EMPHASIS UPON THE PROBLEM OF MUTABILITY

A PART OF A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY
1938

By
CLARENCE H. SCHETTLER

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INTRODUCTION

The concept, personality trait, was practically unknown before 1900. Persons thought, spoke, and wrote with other concepts that language embodied. These antecedent concepts, e.g., faculty, innate ideas, elemental ideas, instinct, and power, were functions of particular collective experiences that were expressed in the general social milieu, specialized heritages, and personal inventiveness. Although the cause of change is not definitely known, concurrent changes in collective experiences and concepts are historical facts. The rise and decline of these earlier concepts indicate the probable course of the concept of personality trait.

A concept is organized thought that results from the study of a problem. In a particular generation, writers disagree frequently in their answers to a problem, and consequently several concepts exist simultaneously, for instance, the rivalry between innate and acquired ideas. Besides these conflicts, there are similarities among some concepts that facilitate their mutual substitution. A predominant likeness among many successive as well as contemporaneous concepts exists because they are frequently answers to similar problems. Theoretically, succeeding concepts organize later experiences into answers to even similar problems. To this extent, every concept performs a unique function in the cultural life that created it.

Personality trait emerged as a concept from a general social life that expressed the tendencies of democracy, urbanization, efficiency, social christianity, and specialization; from the special heritages of characterology, evolution, measurement of individual differences, social psychological analysis of the self, abnormal psychology, psychoanalysis, and vocational guidance; and from the creative thought of many writers. It represents the conjunction of the concepts of personality and trait. Personality was a principal interest in psychiatry, social psychology of the self, and vocational guidance. Character which

was frequently used interchangeably with personality was the subject of attention in characterology and psychoanalysis. Trait was specially prominent in discussions of evolution and measurements of individual differences. In the later developments of each trend of thought, personality and trait were commonly the media of expression for organized thought. The concept, personality trait, appeared as early as 1921.

In the early part of the specialized trends, the concepts of characteristic, instinct, quality, talent, etc., were prevalent. Trait became increasingly prominent in answers to problems that were earlier explained by these concepts. In combination with personality, trait incorporated the recent thoughts upon self, experience, interaction, motive, integration, etc., as an explanatory concept in answers to problems. The concept of personality trait emerged plurally rather than singularly from these several trends of thought though similar problems of permanence, mutability, generality, and specificity of traits existed in each trend. From the history of antecedent concepts, this multiple denotation of personality trait is inevitable.

CHAPTER III

DEFINITIONS OF PERSONALITY TRAIT

A definition provides a common basis of understanding and prevents an entrance into a logomachy of words. The following definitions are organized according to emphases, and consequently, the divisions are not entirely independent exclusive viewpoints. The order of presentation is chronological. To the present writer's knowledge, the earliest formal definition of personality trait was given by G. Allport and F. Allport in 1921.

General, Permanent, Biological Adjustment

In his earlier accounts, G. Allport regards traits as genuine components of personality which involve the neural integration of similar, specific habits of adjustment.[1] They constitute relations, especially in the sphere of conation,[2] rather than specific habit grooves.[3] He gives eight characteristics of a personality trait.

1. A trait has more than nominal existence.
2. A trait is more generalized than a habit.
3. A trait is dynamic.
4. The existence of a trait may be established empirically or statistically.
5. Traits are only relatively independent of each other.
6. A trait of personality, psychologically considered, has nothing to do with moral quality.
7. Acts or even habits, which are inconsistent with a trait, are not proof of the non-existence of the trait.
8. A trait may be viewed either in the light of the personality which contains it, or in the light of its distribution in the population at large.[4]

In a later article, he states that real personality traits

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[1]"Personality Traits: Their Classification and Measurement," JAP, XVI (1921), 21.

[2]"Study of Personality by the Intuitive Method," JAP, XXIV (1929), 16.

[3]"Concepts of Trait and Personality," PB, XXIV (1927), 289.

[4]"What is a Trait of Personality," ICP, IX (1931), 57 f.

"designate generalized and personalized determining tendencies--consistent and stable modes of an individual's adjustment to his environment."[1] In his recent book, Allport writes that personality trait is

> . . . . a generalized and focalized neuropsychic system (peculiar to the individual), with the capacity to render many stimuli functionally equivalent, and to initiate and guide consistent (equivalent) forms of adaptive and expressive behavior.[2]
>
> The units of personality are complex neuropsychic dispositions, in this volume generically called traits. They are internally generalized, flexible, interdependent dispositions, attuned to a range of equivalent stimuli and issuing into an equivalent range of responses. It is their function to guarantee stability and economy in personal life.[3]
>
> . . . . traits are more inclusive than habits, being compounded of them and of the underlying, still more specific, modes of adjustment . . . . Traits are simply nodal points in the structure of personality, regions of adaptive stress, foci of adjustment.[4]

A trait is dynamic in the reception of a stimulus and in the direction of a response.[5] It is represented in muscular sets and changes[6](Physique, intelligence, and temperament are not traits but are the raw materials that originate traits.).[7] A single performance is never a univocal product of one trait.[8] Usually, a trait is identified by a nuclear quality or focus, i.e., its telic significance.[9]

Allport enlarges upon the motive aspect of traits. He cautions against the identification of similar symptoms or different responses in two persons as indicative respectively of the same trait or different traits.[10] His argument is that traits are directive or motivational tendencies[11] as well as stylistic expressions. All motives, however, are not traits. Those that are specific in reference or temporary are never traits. Occasionally, a trait does not have a motive. For example, politeness is a stylistic trait that lacks a directive tendency. Ordinarily, the genuine personality traits are not directly observed. Only

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[1]"Trait Names--A Psycho-Lexical Study," PM, XLVII (1936), 26.

[2]Personality--A Psychological Interpretation (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1937), p. 295.

[3]Ibid., pp. 559 f. [4]Ibid., p. 146. [5]Ibid., p. 319.

[6]Ibid., p. 482. [7]Ibid., pp. 403,405,429.

[8]Ibid., pp. 326 f. [9]Ibid., p. 327. [10]Ibid., p. 449.

[11]Ibid., pp. 290,323.

specific adaptive acts that follow one another in quick succession are perceived. The real traits must be inferred.[1] In regard to the process of inference, Allport calls attention to pseudo traits that are due to errors in deduction[2] and to hidden meanings that are created when there is no basis in fact for them.[3]

Allport's theory of personality traits is a biophysical conception because he considers traits independent of the observer.[4] He says that " . . . . behind all confusion of terms, behind the disagreement of judges, and apart from errors and failures of empirical observation, there are none the less bona fide mental structures in each personality that account for the consistency of behavior."[5] This distinction between personality traits and observations of them appears in the discussions of trait names, and common traits. Trait names, e.g., honesty, are evaluations of the social or moral significance of conduct. They have no necessary correspondence to partially[6] integrated neural behavior, e.g., ascendancy, conservativeness, and gregariousness,[7] which represent personality traits. Trait names, however, are important.

> Linguistic symbols have demonstrated utility, they have been tested throughout the ages for their power of representing stable facts of experience. If many human beings are not in fact egotistic, aggressive, or timid, the epithets would not have found a permanent place in language.[8]

Common traits are not true traits[9] but are measurable aspects of complex individual traits. Frequently, they reflect cultural forms of adaptation.[10] Whenever the common traits coincide with neuropsychic dispositions (true traits), the correspondence is accidental.[11] The fundamental differences between these kinds of traits are given in the distinctions between the person and the socius.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 313 f. [2] Ibid., pp. 324 f. [3] Ibid., p. 474.

[4] Ibid., p. 289. [5] Ibid.

[6] American Psychiatric Association, Proceedings--Second Colloquium on Personality Investigation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1930), pp. 152 f.

[7] "Composition of Political Attitudes," AJS, XXXV (1929), 221 ff.

[8] "Trait Names, etc.," p. 19. [9] Personality, p. 299.

[10] Ibid., p. 436. [11] Ibid., p. 300.

> The former is the complete man, a unique biophysical product in whom cultural influences have been embedded in individual ways within a biological ground. The socius is the man viewed in reference to his social status. His beliefs, attitudes and traits are regarded as conforming to, or deviating from, societal standards. The frame of reference in the former case is the person himself; in the latter case, external social norms.[1]
>
> The personalities of some individuals within the culture conform more closely than do others to the ideal type for the culture. In some instances of marked conformity it might almost be said that the socius is the personality; but such a degree of typicality is rare. Only in part does the person take on the character of the socius, and only in part do his expressions conform to standard.[2]

F. Allport defines personality traits ". . . . not as elementary psychological mechanisms, but as groups of characteristic reactions based upon native constitution and systems of habit, and selected for observation as exhibiting the typical adjustments of the individual to his environment . . . . the traits selected shall be both fundamental in importance and mutually exclusive in scope."[3] The main personality categories are intelligence, motility, temperament, self-expression, and sociality.

The social nature of an individual " . . . . while latent as a physiological possibility remains unexpressed because his solitary environment contains no stimuli adequate for evoking it."[4]

Allport admits that traits can be described and measured only by social standards. He abandons this idea, however, in the assertion[5] that a fundamental trait cannot always be observed and rated because it is frequently hidden below the surface. It resides in biological differences and the habit systems that are based upon them.

A. Gilliland defines personality traits as the constituent elements of personality.[7] The principle traits are intelligence,

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[1] Ibid., p. 300 footnote. [2] Ibid., p. 469.

[3] Social Psychology (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1924), p. 102.

[4] Ibid., p. 101.

[5] "Self Evaluation: A Problem in Personal Development," MH, XI (1927), 72.

[6] "Culture Conflict Versus the Individual as Factors in Delinquency," SF, IX (1931), 493.

[7] Genetic Psychology (New York: Ronald Press, 1933).

aggressiveness or forcefulness, sociability, personal appearance, and morality.[1] On the basis of studies of aggressiveness[2] and sociability,[3] he decides that traits are general manifestations of behavior. They are measured by group standards, and are subject to modification.

H. Hollingworth describes individual traits as physiological attributes that are permanent and general.[4]

H. Kitson[5] accepts the generality and permanency of mental traits, e.g., intelligence, because they are organically inherited. In one passage,[6] he remarks, however, that all individual characteristics change.

E. Morris[7] adopts F. Allport's viewpoint in her test which measures the personality traits of successful teachers.

J. Plant designates personality traits as the inherent predispositions in the nervous organization to fairly uniform modes of behavior.

> These predispositions are the personality traits and in summation constitute the personality, have a high degree of elasticity in that they resist alteration; and should be clearly distinguished from mental habits, attitudes or content which are the phenomena arising from the response of these personality traits to stimuli. The wholly adequate proof of a personality trait could be said to exist to the extent that any individual, all through life in response to the most varied stimuli, showed a uniformity in some mode of reacting.[8]

E. Krueger and W. Reckless[9] think that the traits, dull, stupid, and brilliant, which are permanent and general, have a

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[1]"Problems of Personality," JAP, XXIII (1928), 372 ff.

[2]H. Moore and A. Gilliland, "Measurement of Aggressiveness," Journal of Applied Psychology, V (1921), 97-118.

[3]A. Gilliland and R. Burke, "Measurement of Sociability," Journal of Applied Psychology, X (1926), 315.

[4]H. L. Hollingworth, Judging Human Character (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1923), p. 145.

[5]Psychology of Vocational Adjustment (Philadelphia: J. Lippincott Co., 1925), pp. 62 ff.

[6]Ibid., p. 226.

[7]Personal Traits and Success in Teaching (New York: Columbia University, 1929). Also "Measuring Leadership," PJ, IX (1930), 124-127.

[8]American Psychiatric Association, op. cit., pp. 152 f.

[9]Social Psychology (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1931), p. 294.

neural basis. About other traits, these co-authors think differently.

M. Shirley[1] states that the constancy and generality of traits, e.g., irritability and placidity, indicate the existence of a nuclear personality at birth.

In the analysis of leadership, C. Case says that "personality traits represent the more abiding aspects of leadership although they themselves are conceived of as in process of change and development."[2] He quotes the lists by R. Park and E. Burgess, and F. Allport as illustrations of personality traits. He mentions specifically perceptual ability, emotional breadth, insight, and drive, as the "rather permanent traits."

In the evaluation of these definitions, attention will be given primarily to the viewpoints of G. Allport and F. Allport because their views are well known.

What does G. Allport mean by neural patterns of behavior in his definition of personality trait? If he means that the nervous system is the instrument of activity, the point is acceptable because it had been established years ago by John Dewey and others. If he means that traits are neural activities, the facts in its favor should be presented. I. Pavlov[3] writes cautiously about the knowledge of nerve structure and function. Experiments by Franz and Lashley have perplexed some devotees of the reflex arc scheme. Sherrington and Coghill make no direct applications of their findings on neural integrations to personality traits. G. Allport, himself, admits that he has not verified his belief. It is surprising therefore that he designates benevolent, tolerant, patient, aggressive, introverted, sociable, etc., biophysical traits or neuropsychic dispositions[4] when

> . . . . all accounts of integrative growth in physiological terms are at the present time highly speculative.[5]
>
> Though little enough is known concerning the neural equivalents of generalized dispositions, the trend of evidence so

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[1] First Two Years (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1933).

[2] "Leadership and Conjuncture--A Sociological Hypothesis," SSR, XVII (1933), 510-513.

[3] Conditioned Reflexes (London: Oxford University Press, 1927), p. 8.

[4] Personality, pp. 306 f. and 139 f.

[5] Ibid., p. 141.

> far as it goes favors such a theory rather than one of insulated habits.[1]
>
> . . . . (traits) are here accepted as biophysical facts, actual psychophysical dispositions related--though no one yet knows how--to persistent neural systems of stress and determination.[2]
>
> . . . . information is too meager to warrant at the present time a physiological account of the operation of traits.[3]

If Allport could demonstrate the neural composition of ascendancy, conservativeness, gregariousness, and the non-neural nature of honesty, accuracy, etc., he would probably win many supporters.

His distinctions between personality traits and linguistic concepts; individual traits and common traits; biophysical and biosocial conceptions of personality suggest (1) a difference between pre-verbal and verbal experiences; and (2) the existence of two realms of reality: physical and social. Studies of felt experiences or unverbalized conduct by C. Darwin,[4] W. White,[5] J. Dorsey,[6] G. Dearborn,[7] S. Blanton and M. Gray[8] present a case for the existence of behavior patterns that are independent of trait words. The studies do not show, however, that these patterns are separate from the cultural expectancies of groups. In fact, it is through felt experiences that a child becomes sensitized to minute changes in the conduct of others.[9]

There are adherents and opponents to the belief that there are two realms of reality. Allport is an adherent. He thinks that each human being has an equal amount of personality,[10] including a solitary dweller on a desert island who is unknown to any other mortal.[11] Personality is what an individual is regard-

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[1] Ibid., p. 257. [2] Ibid., p. 339. [3] Ibid., p. 319.

[4] Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (London: J. Murray, 1873).

[5] W. White, Mechanisms of Character Formation (New York: Macmillan Co., 1916), p. 56.

[6] Foundations of Human Nature (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1935), p. 161.

[7] Motor-Sensory Development (Baltimore: Warwick, 1910), pp. 3 ff.

[8] Child Guidance (New York: Century Co., 1927), p. 43.

[9] W. Dummer (ed.), The Unconscious--A Symposium (New York: A. Knopf, 1928), p. 137.

[10] On p. 143, he contradicts this statement in characterizing the simplicity of a country grandmother.

[11] Personality, pp. 40 f.

less of the perception or evaluation of his qualities by others.[1] Traits are wholly within the compass of the individual.[2] They are psycho-neurological dispositions that make an individual self-sustaining, self-active, and self-determining.[3] According to Allport, writers who accept the biosocial viewpoint, especially sociologists, deny personality to a solitary dweller, reject the self-sufficiency of the individual, consider personality a reflection of the social environment,[4] regard habits as inflexibly bound to environmental stimuli, and ignore complex elements that involve subjective factors.[5] He criticizes the sociological definition of personality as the subjective aspect of culture because no individual mirrors exactly and exclusively his social environment; individuality is amazingly varied;[6] and the role of biological determinants (intelligence, temperament, physical heredity) is ignored.[7]

Allport interprets correctly the sociologist's position that a solitary dweller on a desert island who is unknown to any other mortal has no personality. Confirmatory evidence for the sociologist's decision is given unwittingly by Allport in the following statements.

> It is obvious that the prime factor in the development of any personality is the influence of other personalities.[8]
>
> Chiefly through speech the child takes over his beliefs and norms of conduct from adults . . . . a word inevitably carries with it the weight of pre-existing socialized forms of thought. The result is that the thinker, as he comes to depend on verbalized concepts, tends more and more to guide his conduct and to build his personality into conventional molds.[9]
>
> . . . . in the process of growth and extension of interests, newly adopted codes and manners represent genuine, not superficial, alterations in personality.[10]
>
> . . . . the ever-changing nature of traits and their close dependence upon the fluid conditions of the environment.[11]

These quotations tell why the solitary dweller, who incidentally has never existed, cannot have a personality. In brief, the reasons are that there is no human environment in the form of other personalities, speech, codes, adult norms of conduct, to give him a personality.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 40, 559. [2] Ibid., p. 295. [3] Ibid., p. 194.
[4] Ibid., pp. 37 f. [5] Ibid., p. 249. [6] Ibid., p. 372.
[7] Ibid., pp. 38 f. [8] Ibid., p. 186. [9] Ibid., pp. 166 f.
[10] Ibid., p. 169.
[11] Ibid., p. 312. See also pp. 209 and 144 for further state-

Although Allport admits that personality is largely fashioned through the impact of culture upon the individual, and the introception and modification of social conventions or codes,[1] he insists that the psychologist is not interested "in the factors shaping personality, rather in personality itself as a developing structure."[2] Stated differently, psychological interest is in the personality of the individual without reference to the perceptions and evaluations by others. Nevertheless, Allport along with sociologists gives assent in some passages to the belief that an individual's personality is known only through the perceptions and evaluations by others, social experiences, and participation in a common milieu. Consider the import of the following statements.

> No person can understand any other person completely, for it is impossible for one human being to share directly the motives, thoughts, and feelings of another.[3]
>
> The most general rule is that one understands best those personalities that are like one's own.[4]
>
> A good judge requires . . . . a rich store of experience with human nature . . . . . Another . . . . requirement is that the judge in his own nature resemble the individual whom he is attempting to judge . . . . . As a rule people cannot comprehend others who are more complex and subtle than they.[5]
>
> . . . . only by knowing the 'frame of reference' within which a personality has developed can the interviewer understand fully his subject's pre-conceptions and codes.[6]

Allport construes erroneously the conception of environment that is held by most sociologists. Few, if any, sociologists would accept the external conception of environment that Allport gives in the excerpts from Sinclair Lewis' Work of Art.[7] Sociologists agree with Allport that the child's conception of himself is the subjective nucleus for the development of his personality--". . . . the very keystone to his structure of personality."[8] The following statement by Allport is definitely sociological.

> . . . . nothing contributes to the unity of personality as much as this subjective point of reference, by virtue of which the individual feels that there is coherence between his memories of the past and his plans for the future. Self-consciousness is necessary for self-esteem, for aspiration, and is a pre-condition of status in the social group (by which, in turn, it is profoundly modified). All these factors are unifying in their effects. Gradually the self extends in

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ments of this viewpoint.

[1] Ibid., pp. 371 f. [2] Ibid., p. viii. [3] Ibid., p. 499.
[4] Ibid., p. 519. [5] Ibid., pp. 513 ff.
[6] Ibid., p. 511. [7] Ibid., p. 102. [8] Ibid., p. 160.

> such a way that it is closely identified with personal possessions, with other people, and with introcepted ideals and cultural standards.[1]

Sociologists as well as Allport are concerned about individuality and the predominance of subjective factors. They consider the individual's perception and interpretation of social environments the real effective environment just as Allport contends in two passages.

> Equivalence and similarity are not uniform for all; they are a personal matter, and hence it is impossible to predict for people en masse the transfer value of a single experience.[2]
>
> Even while the individual, through training, learns to behave to wide ranges of stimuli in essentially the same way (perceiving them as similar), at the same time he must constantly meet and master new demands.[3]

Sociologists take exception to Allport's notion that the individual's personality is self-contained, self-sufficient, and independent of all social environments. Undoubtedly, there is personal autonomy with respect to some social environments but the individual who identifies himself with certain social groups by incorporating their codes as personal ideals is hardly independent of them. In one passage, Allport concedes the dependency of the self or individual personality upon some social environments, and he grants indirectly this fact in many paragraphs. For instance, he writes that

> . . . . all experiences of pain, frustration, and especially of social ridicule engender acute states of self-consciousness that leave permanent effects. Whenever one is unable to achieve, or to continue in, a condition of friendly relation with the environment, he must perforce pay attention to his own shortcomings, and thereby become acutely aware of the incompatibility between himself and the physical and social world outside, and of his isolation.[4]

In other words, one sees oneself as others see him,[5] and self-consciousness is a product of the individual's participation in social relations rather than a pre-condition to status.

In view of some sociological conceptions that Allport expresses, it is surprising that he accepts biophysical variables devoid of social judgment,[6] that he postulates socially non-evaluated personality traits,[7] that he thinks memory, intelligence,

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[1] Ibid., p. 345. [2] Ibid., p. 285. [3] Ibid., p. 284.
[4] Ibid., p. 164. [5] Ibid., p. 223. [6] Ibid., p. 400.
[7] Ibid., pp. 306 ff.

and volition are real only so far as they are organic,[1] that he considers personality independent of the observer.[2] Occasionally, Allport deviates from these tenets, and accepts the sociological viewpoint that the physical is known through the mediating experiences of the social; that standards of social judgment are inescapable whether one speaks about neural, linguistic, moral, or social facts. To illustrate,

> If the man objects that all the world, including the psychologist, is wrong about him, he cannot of course be disproved, but in such a case the evaluation of his insight becomes virtually impossible.[3]
> . . . . the process of understanding personality requires both intuition and inference.[4]

In several places, Allport reiterates the thought of the second quotation, emphasizing especially, the process of inference. Is not an inference a form of evaluation that is based upon social experiences? To say that a man is absent-minded or assertive (real personality traits according to Allport) signifies the pronouncement of a judgment upon his actions, and the judgment depends upon what the observer has learned through social experiencesto consider absent-minded or assertive. An ideal or standard that has been created in a social milieu is employed in every description of things, persons, or activities. Ideals or standards are practically infinite. They vary by social environments, by persons, and within a person. Indirectly, Allport gives confirmation in some passages[5] to these functions of ideals or standards. In accordance with his intention to respect all sides in the presentation of the psychology of personality,[6] it would be a more synthetic viewpoint if Allport accepted not only the formative influences of the social environment and heredity upon personality, but also, conceded the fact that traits do not represent solely biophysical activities.

F. Allport differs from G. Allport in the recognition of the functions of environment and standards, respectively, in the release and evaluation of traits. They agree, however, that

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[1] Ibid., p. 19. [2] Ibid., p. 535. [3] Ibid., p. 122.

[4] Ibid., p. 547.

[5] See pp. 390 ff; 426; 500; 504; and compare pp. 354 with 422-423.

[6] Ibid., p. vii.

personality traits are physiological. If F. Allport really understood the functions of environment and standards, he would recognize that traits are basically social. It is a reasonable belief that environment creates rather than releases traits. The pre-environmental nature of traits is extremely hypothetical.

Another difference between these men is indicated in the assertions that the fundamental traits are exclusive of one another (F. Allport) and that they are relatively independent of one another (G. Allport). In the statement of the former, a total unity of activity is precluded, and a trait can be only a part of personality. In the statement of the latter, a trait can be descriptive of a large part, if not the total, of personality.

Gilliland concurs with G. Allport and F. Allport that traits are general, and with F. Allport that standards are necessary in the evaluation of traits. He differs from these men in his acceptance of trait changes, identification of self with personality, and the social origin of some traits.

Hollingworth implies that individual traits are structural activities and that they are organically inherited. To this extent, he agrees with G. Allport and F. Allport. He disagrees with them in his recognition of situational traits that are neither general nor permanent.

Kitson, Krueger and Reckless endorse the viewpoint of G. Allport and F. Allport with regard to certain traits. Other traits are considered specific and changeable.

Morris, Plant, and Shirley agree fundamentally with the conception of personality trait that is held by G. Allport and F. Allport. Shirley differs with them in her recognition of maturational trait changes.

The true position of Case is indeterminable because he accepts the divergent viewpoints of F. Allport and E. Burgess. In the quotation, he acknowledges the possibility of trait changes which neither Allport nor Burgess grants.

Actions, Reactions, Tendencies

R. Filter defines abstractly the trait of self-assurance. It is " . . . . a list of typical situations which commonly evoke the reactions that are given this trait-name, together with the

reactions comprising the trait."[1] He considers self assurance a complex trait and allows for the influence of other traits before he decides that certain reactions indicate it.

W. Charters and I. Whitely define personality traits "in terms of trait-actions, or actions by which the possession of the trait is demonstrated . . . . e.g., versatility: she must be able to follow along in all kinds of projects; she must be able to turn from one thing to another easily."[2] In the translation of reported traits, these co-authors discard terms that are not indicative of personality traits, e.g., high ideals (too general); professional technique (matter of training); education (content rather than activity); culture (matter of training and content); system (method rather than quality); personality (too general); and efficiency (too general).

G. Brandenburg suggests a definition of personality trait in his description of personality as "a composite of an individual's typical reactions, physical, intellectual, emotional, to his environment, together with his various physical characteristics which constitute what we call his general appearance."[3] Character which is a part of personality signifies the emotional and instinctive qualities that are mainly innate. Other phases of personality are environmental. Illustrations of personality and character traits include respectively tact, enthusiasm, forcefulness, physical appearance, and reliability, sincerity, morality.

M. Prince describes personality traits as

> . . . . the sentiments and ideals with their meanings for the individual; the more complex habits, the fixed acquired beliefs and prejudices and likes and dislikes; the accepted ethical and social codes of conduct; the aspirations and enduring desires; the innate cravings or urges, or impulsions and appetites and inherited tendencies in general; and many other analogous characteristics of human nature . . . . traits are manifested as reactions to situations . . . . . a trait may be defined as an habitual mental reaction characteristic of the individual to an actual or ideal situation.[4]

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[1] "Experimental Study of Character Traits," Journal of Applied Psychology, V (1921), 297.

[2] Analysis of Secretarial Duties and Traits (Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins Co., 1924), p. 158.

[3] "Analyzing Personality," Journal of Applied Psychology, IX (1925), 141 ff.

[4] M. Prince, "Why We Have Traits--Normal and Abnormal," JAP, XXIII (1928), 422.

He asserts that traits are not simple habits, e.g., smoking, acquired tastes for food, odors, customs, manners, etiquette, and dress, which are usually "conditioned reflexes." He insists that a trait is a relatively complex, persistent reaction.[1] In some passages, he emphasizes the conscious and unconscious motives along with the objective nature of a trait.

H. Overstreet thinks that traits are the components of personality or character.

> . . . . they are nothing very mysterious, they are only his predominant habit systems. The reader's kindliness, for example, is his habit of thinking of other people, of doing them a service; his thoroughness is a habit he has, in every task he undertakes, of seeing that each detail is attended to, his lack of irritability is his habit of controlling himself under trying circumstances.[2]

These habit systems or traits are modifiable, but impulses, e.g., sex, avoidance of danger, desire for food and warmth, that are basic to them are permanent.

David Levy says that

> Social responses typical for a given individual are known as his traits. Traits that have to do with ethical relations are termed 'character,' though the latter term is used also loosely as synonymous with personality.[3]

He adds that personality is shaped by physical constitution, illness, intelligence, special talents, and social experiences.

C. Zachry implies a definition of personality trait in her description of abnormal traits. Insanity "is made up of individuals who show no other symptoms, ... than abnormal personality traits or abnormal development of their mechanisms of adjustment."[4] These mechanisms of adjustment, e.g., defense, compensation, and escape, are habit patterns that represent the individual's adjustment between his biological inheritance and social environment. They are permanent tendencies that compose personality.[5]

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[1] C. Murchison (ed.), Psychologies of 1925 (Worcester: Clark University, 1926), pp. 246 f.

[2] Influencing Human Behavior (New York: People's Institute Publishing Co., 1926), p. 147.

[3] American Psychiatric Association, op. cit., p. 151.

[4] Personality Adjustments of School Children (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1929), p. 60.

[5] Curiously, she gives an explanation of personality changes but none of permanency.

F. Wise who tabulated the trait terms that appear in grade school readers gives her criterion of trait terms in the following quotations.

> A trait term is the name of a character trait or personality characteristic. In a context any word or phrase which functions either as a general or generic name for a group of human activities or to connote human activities is a trait term. Patience, bravery, conceit, calmness . . . . all are trait terms . . . . . A trait term suggests specific activities; it is also the name for a group of activities which have in common the element named by the trait term.[1]
>
> These terms function in two ways, either they describe an individual . . . . or they describe his activity.[2]

F. Goodenough describes personality traits as

> . . . . characteristic modes of behavior which appear so often in the course of our association with some particular person that we grow to expect him to behave in that way and to think of him in terms of these behavior patterns, e.g., as being calm, frank, friendly, brusque, or co-operative--owe much of their apparent consistency to broad factors in the general environment which remain fairly constant for a given person but which vary from one person to another.[3]

In other passages and another writing,[4] she recognizes the specificity and changeability of personality traits. Throughout, she maintains that traits must be defined with reference to the social world.

M. Curti gives several statements of her conception of a personality trait.

> The divisions between habits and traits and type-traits are relative and shifting. They are not well defined entities, but only functional relationships which are distinguishable in a total of adaptive activity.[5]
>
> A trait is a relative and a functional grouping of habits and attitudes, and so we shall expect to find overlappings and groupings of various sorts.[6]

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[1] "The Trait Terms in Grade School Readers," (Unpublished Master's thesis, Department of Education, University of Chicago, 1929), pp. 16 ff.

[2] Ibid., p. 19.

[3] Developmental Psychology (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1934), p. 444.

[4] "Inter-Relationships in the Behavior of Young Children," CD, I (1930), 29-47.

[5] Child Psychology (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1930), p. 500.

[6] Ibid., p. 473.

> We might thus think of traits as systems of habits, and apply the name 'type-traits' to systems of habits.[1]
>
> . . . . traits represent systems of reactive possibilities built up in the process of learning how to adjust to recurrent problematic situations of a similar nature, and how larger groupings of traits are developed in connection with life situations peculiar to the individual child. The traits and groupings of traits once formed, themselves function as motives which play a part in the further integration of experience. Personality may thus be conceived as a hierarchy of traits, the final integration of which implies a dominant motivating basis in some aim for the conduct of life as a whole.[2]

W. Burnham[3] formulates no concise definition of personality trait though he refers to traits as characteristics and responses. In some passages, he is skeptical of the value of the concept of personality trait.

M. Sherman thinks that personality traits are relatively permanent reactions to environment,[4] and that environmental conditions determine whether traits are specific or general.[5]

R. Wheeler and F. Perkins imply a definition of personality trait in their discussions of children's traits, and gestalt psychology. The major characteristics of a child's personality are the traits that must be modified and adjusted to environmental demands.[6] From the gestalt viewpoint, traits are points of reference within the whole personality.

M. Krout[7] does not state clearly his conception of trait in the literature that he reviews. In the description of traits, he uses in one passage Kantor's phrase, "the reactional biography of the individual."

A. Emmons defines the trait of self-assurance

> . . . . as loosely organized tendencies to behave in characteristic ways, developed gradually in response to environment and capable of being modified by training and experience.[8]

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[1] Ibid., p. 475. [2] Ibid., p. 502.

[3] Wholesome Personality (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1932).

[4] Mental Hygiene and Education (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1934).

[5] Development of Attitudes (New York: Payne Fund, 1933).

[6] Principles of Mental Development (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1932), pp. 11 and 227.

[7] Major Aspects of Personality (Chicago: College Press, 1933).

[8] "Study of the Relation Between Self-Assurance and Skill in Young Children," CD, IV (1933), 323-328.

L. Brown reminds his readers that character, personality, social type, and personality pattern are interrelated. The idea of interrelation is also present in his statements on personality traits.

> Habits are traits of personality since one is what he does. Much of one's behavior is habitual behavior.[1]
>
> Growing out of the development of attitudes and the process of acquiring a world in which to live are certain character traits. These character traits are not only tendencies to act but are tendencies to act in a particular direction when situations have to be met. Thus they are forces in human nature. A person has many character traits, but usually there is one that is dominant . . . . . These character traits are personality adjustments to experience. They are reactions of individuals in certain situations and have various functions.[2]

F. Howard and F. Patry[3] suggest that traits are the reaction systems or total effect of the stimulus-response mechanism. They compose personality.

The foregoing definitions will be evaluated in the order of their presentation. In Filter's usage, a trait is physical rather than imaginative activity. The emphasis upon typical reactions suggests that a trait is relatively permanent and general. The typicalness of a trait is the common attribute among the elements that are the specific factors of a complex trait. By complexity, Filter means presumably a differentiated unity because he deals with several elements.

Charters and Whitley are non-committal on the permanency, changeability, generality, specificity, and typicalness of traits. They restrict trait action to definite external activity, and eliminate such things as ideals and motives.

Brandenburg specifies the nature of the typical reactions, namely, physical, intellectual, and emotional. Also, he includes in his definition, non-active characteristics, e.g., physical appearance.

Prince includes not only the physical activity but also motives and imaginative activity. He is not explicit, however, on the nature and extent of simple habits or conditioned reflexes

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[1] Social Psychology (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1934), p. 483.

[2] Ibid., p. 400.

[3] Mental Health (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1935), p. 203.

that are not traits. For instance, he excludes customs and manners but includes social codes of conduct in his conception of trait. For all practical purposes, customs and social codes of conduct are synonymous.

In Overstreet's definition, a trait includes any habitual activity whether objective or subjective. Presumably, new conduct is excluded though Overstreet says little about non-habitual actions. Levy is in essential agreement with Overstreet's viewpoint.

Zachry does not differentiate mechanisms of adjustment from habitual social adjustments. Both are designated personality traits. The concepts are not, however, necessarily identical. Habits that change can be indicators of mechanisms of adjustment that do not change.

Wise has an inclusive conception of trait. It denotes activity that is overt, subjective, potential, general, or specific. She admits readily that potential activity is indeterminable in many personal characterizations.

Goodenough is aware of the relation between standards and traits but she does not indicate precisely its nature. The "broad factors in the general environment" are undefined. Nevertheless, she recognizes that the attributes, generality, permanency, etc., are not intrinsic characteristics of traits. Rather, these attributes are functions of the relation between traits and standards.

Curti combines the ideas of several definitions in her description of traits as activities, typical habits, hierarchies of complex habits, motives, functional relationships, and integrations. She omits standards, but adds a new idea, i.e., the relation between traits and conflict situations. Unlike Overstreet, she designates traits as the new activity of conflict situations, as well as, organized, characteristic behavior. She departs from this inclusive conception where she denies personality traits to a child under three years of age because organized, characteristic behavior is wanting.

Burnham's remarks are general and vague. His description of trait as a characteristic or response is unenlightening without additional material.

According to Sherman, trait includes everything except physical characteristics that are not definitely involved in

reactions. He does not distinguish between reactions and actions. A similar viewpoint is expressed in the definitions by Krout, Howard and Patry.

Wheeler and Perkins differ decidedly from writers who think that traits are elements or parts. For these co-authors, traits are aspects of a total pattern of activity--the personality. In the actual manipulation of trait data, they depart considerably from the gestalt viewpoint.

The viewpoint of Emmons coincides with that of Filter in the emphasis upon characteristic behavior, complexity, elements, and social situations.

Brown sacrifices a precise definition of personality trait for an extended exposition of the wholeness of activity. In his descriptions of traits, there are references to experience, group standards, conflict situations, motives, overt acts, subjective tendencies to act, automatic behavior, deliberate activity, new and old conduct.

To summarize the evaluation of these definitions, the descriptions of personality traits as typical reactions, actions, or tendencies do not signify unanimity of thought. Writers differ with one another in regard to the objectivity, subjectivity, complexity, etc., of reactions, actions, or tendencies. They do agree that traits are not entities or substances.

In contrast with the writers in the first group of definitions, the present writers do not (1) emphasize the physiological nature of traits; (2) separate linguistic or situational traits from physiological or individual traits; and (3) consider all traits permanent and general. Those who stress characteristic or typical reactions give partial endorsement to the permanency and generality of traits. Those who emphasize only actions or reactions make no commitment on the permanency and generality of traits. Although writers in the first group mention the dynamic quality of traits, they make it a secondary emphasis. The present writers regard action or reaction as the outstanding criterion of a personality trait.

Behavior Patterns of Early Social Experiences

According to E. Burgess, there is usually in an individual a permanent, basic trait that pervades and organizes all traits. For instance, the personality traits of Stanley, a delinquent boy,

are organized around the basic trait of injustice which originated in early social experiences. These traits include self-pity, hyper-criticalness of others, censure of others, unwillingness to accept blame, excessive interest in attention, lack of insight, unjustified suspicion, idea of persecution, rationalization, immunity from suggestions, resentment of correction, resistance to direction, tendency to moralize, quick decision, strength of reaction, etc.

> The foregoing traits are, it seems, the characteristic attributes of the personality pattern of the individual who is able even under adverse circumstances to maintain his ego against an unfriendly and even hostile social world.[1]

An accurate comprehension of this conception of personality trait is impossible without a knowledge of the distinction that Burgess makes between personality and social type. He gives the following definitions of personality.

> . . . . the sum and co-ordination of those traits which determine the role and the status of the individual in the social group.[2]

> . . . . personality from the standpoint of group life is essentially the conception which the person has of his role and status in the group as influenced and modified in social interaction.[3]

> . . . . the sum and integration of those traits which characterize the typical reactions of one person toward other persons.[4]

The personality pattern is formed through the social interaction of constitutional and experiential factors in the social matrix of family relationships and play groups during infancy and early childhood.[5] In the formation of the personality pattern, the wishes of security and new experience (tendencies to approach and withdraw) are converted into personal relations by the wishes of recognition and response. These four wishes are expressed in early social situations where an individual reacts in (1) direct

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[1] C. Shaw, Jack-Roller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), pp. 190 f.

[2] "Study of the Delinquent as a Person," AJS, XXVIII (1922), 663.

[3] American Psychiatric Association, op. cit., p. 11.

[4] C. Shaw, op. cit., p. 193.

[5] C. Shaw, Natural History of a Delinquent Career (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931), p. 251.

activity, (2) indirect activity, or (3) perverse activity. From each of these activities, a personal behavior pattern (e.g., direct activity-extroversion; indirect activity-introversion) develops.

In an early writing, the personal behavior patterns are not identified with personality, spontaneous expressions of temperament, or other human nature traits, but are what the general term "personal behavior patterns implies, namely, characteristic types of the behavior of the person fixed in the matrix of social relations in infancy and childhood."[1] In later writings, personality type and personal behavior pattern are used interchangeably. The latter is sometimes replaced by personality trait.

The basic personality trait or personal behavior pattern of an individual is superficially modifiable. The surface changes are secondary behavior patterns which correct defects in the primary pattern. The so-called fundamental changes in personality are, in reality, modifications in social types.

> The term 'social type' does not refer to the mechanisms of personality reactions but to attitudes, values, and philosophy of life derived from copies presented by society. The role which a person assumes and to which he is assigned by society creates the social type. With Stanley, becoming 'a professional runaway,' 'a delinquent,' 'a criminal,' was taking on a role. His acceptance of the criminal code and the orientation of his ambitions to succeed in a criminal career have to do with attitudes and values and are elements that enter into the creation of a social type. The so-called permutations of personality are the abrupt and often revolutionary changes in social type, not in basic personality patterns. The transformation of Stanley from a criminal to a law-abiding citizen was a change in social type; his personality pattern remained the same.[2]

The social type, e.g., philistine, bohemian, prophet, leader, and mother, is created through the imitation of roles, types, and philosophies of life that are presented in the cultural patterns of groups.

Alfred Adler assumes that every person has a real or an imaginary inferiority, and a social feeling. These determine a person's goal in love, work, and society.[3] The feeling of inferi-

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[1]"Study of the Delinquent as a Person," p. 664.

[2]Shaw, Jack-Roller, pp. 193 ff.

[3]C. Murchison (ed.), Psychologies of 1930 (Worcester: Clark University, 1930), p. 397.

ority which is most important begins early in life.

> A child who raises himself from the ground for the first time comes into an entirely new world, and in that second he somehow senses a hostile atmosphere. In his first attempt at movement, and particularly in rising to his feet and learning to walk, he experiences various degrees of difficulty, which may either strengthen or destroy his hope for the future. Impression which grown-ups might consider unimportant or commonplace, may have an enormous influence on the child's soul and entirely shape his impression of the world in which he lives. In this way children who have had difficulties in locomotion construct an ideal for themselves which is permeated with violent and hasty movements.[1]

The birth position in the family also influences the formation of an individual's life pattern.[2] For instance, the first born is usually conservative, sociable, and domineering.

Most important in the formation of a life pattern is the elemental drive for power or desire for superiority which every person has. In the conflict between this drive and the inferiority feeling, a child develops 'a style of life' (personality type or traits) that is basically immutable.

> A mature patient who has an anxious character, whose mind is constantly filled with doubts and mistrust, whose every effort is directed toward isolating himself from society, shows the identical character traits and psychic movements in his third and fourth year of life, though in their childish simplicity they are more transparently interpreted.[3]

The techniques for attaining the goal of life are principally the character traits (e.g., envy, mustrust, ambition, and laziness) that arise in the process of an individual's adjustment to environment. Changes in character traits are not personality modifications. Adler says that the best evidences for the permanency of life patterns are minute actions.

> People for instance who practice such unpleasant activities as nail-biting or nose-boring do not know that they betray the fact that they are stubborn human beings in doing so, since they do not understand the relationships which have led them to these traits. Yet it is perfectly clear to us that a child must have been scolded repeatedly because of these habits; if, then, he does not give them up, despite the scoldings, he must be a stubborn human being.[4]

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[1] Understanding Human Nature (New York: Greenberg, 1927), p. 397.

[2] Individual Psychology (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1934), pp. 321 f.

[3] Understanding Human Nature, pp. 5 f.

[4] Ibid., p. 100.

Adler and Burgess make a fundamental distinction between the permanent or general and modifiable or specific aspects of conduct. The former is the style of life, personal behavior pattern, or personality trait. The latter is the character trait, social type, or secondary behavior pattern.

Before evaluating this dichotomy, writers who give partial or full endorsement to it will be mentioned. L. Cottrell[1] distinguishes between cultural and individual roles. The latter originate in the early familial situations, and persist in adult behavior. E. Verry[2] concludes from her study of children that the early acquired roles persist in later experiences. E. Krueger and W. Reckless[3] accept the distinction between personality and social type but think that both are changeable. A similar position is upheld by L. Brown.[4] N. Gist and L. Halbert,[5] and E. Lindemann and N. Anderson[6] devote separate chapters to personality and social types but do not establish any differentiations.

An analysis of Burgess' position discloses a gradual shift in the successive definitions of personality from the inclusion of roles, conception of self, and status[7] to the exclusion of them. This refinement of the definition of personality facilitates the distinction between personality and social type. The latter constitutes the exclusions.

The distinction between these types begins in different origins. Personality arises presumably through interaction in early social experiences, and social type arises through imitation in later social experiences (i.e., after the age of six). The mechanism of interaction is not expounded. The mechanism of imitation is role taking which, according to Mead, is social inter-

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[1]"Roles and Marital Adjustment," PASS, XXVII (1933), 108 ff.

[2]"Study of Personality in Pre-School Play Groups," SF, III (1924), 647.

[3]Op. cit., pp. 378 ff. [4]Op. cit., pp. 630 ff.

[5]Urban Society (New York: T. Y. Crowell Co., 1933), chaps. xi-xii.

[6]Urban Sociology (New York: A. Knopf, 1928), chaps. xi-xii.

[7]R. Park and E. Burgess, Introduction to the Science of Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924), p. 70.

action.[1] Burgess thinks that the sense of injustice in Stanley's life developed in social interaction. A sense of injustice cannot exist, however, unless there is a self that experiences the injustice. Since the self arises through role taking, the sense of injustice is partly, if not entirely, a resultant of role-taking or a trait of the social type. It would be helpful if the fundamental differences between interaction and imitation or personality and social types were lucidly stated.

There is probably evidence that some personality traits are unmodified by later social conditioning. Healy[2] was unsuccessful in his treatment of twelve boys who were constitutionally inferior. Burgess interprets these cases as evidences of personal immunity from cultural conditioning (e.g., individuated personality types). This is a permissible deduction provided that the ineffectiveness of the clinician is not identified with a delinquent's personality traits.

Burgess does not adhere to the distinction between personality and social type in several of his writings. In one place, he says that the three sources for the sociological definition of personality are the study of the social self, research in cultural conditioning, and community factors.[3] In the criticism of Burrow, he states that social images, and conceptions of ourselves and others are the nucleus of personality.[4] Attitudes rather than overt acts furnish insight into the motivations of behavior.[5] Egocentrism, a personal behavior pattern, is explained by the complex of family sentiments and attitudes (cultural heritage of a family) that center around the only or favorite child.[6]

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[1]For an analytical discussion of social interaction, see Herbert Blumer "Social Psychology," Man and Society (New York: Prentice Hall, 1937), pp. 169-175.

[2]William Healy, The Individual Delinquent (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1915), pp. 575 ff.

[3]"Cultural Approach to the Study of Personality," MH, XIV (1930), 307 f.

[4]"Family as a Unity of Interacting Personalities," Family, VII (1926), 8.

[5]"What Social Case Records Should Contain to be Useful for Sociological Interpretation," SF, VI (1928), 526.

[6]"Family and the Person," PASS, XXII (1927), 134.

Finally, he says that personality develops and changes in cultural transmission, and in the interaction of the family with the community.[1]

The evaluation of Adler's position centers in his description of the "style of life." It isn't temperament, attitudes, character traits (an individual's attitudes toward fellow members, society, and environment), or the individual's conception of himself[2] because these change. By this process of elimination, the "style of life" remains. The question arises appropriately, what remains? Adler gives no answer, and who else would know? Since persons react to the responses of others (attitudes, character traits, self, etc.), the "style of life," if it exists, cannot be very significant.

Adler does not realize the central position of self in personality. The feeling of inferiority cannot precede the object of self because the self feels the inferiority. Changes in the self which Adler admits are actually modifications in the style of life. Therefore, the distinction between the style of life and character traits is not tenable.

There are differences and similarities among the three groups of definitions that have been considered. Personality traits are physiologically and socially defined respectively in the first and third group. Both distinguish between kinds of traits. For example, there are in the first group linguistic traits and neurological integrations (G. Allport), and in the third group social type traits and personal behavior patterns (E. Burgess). Linguistic and social type traits which are modifiable are not personality traits. Neurological integrations and personal behavior patterns which are permanent are personality traits. In the second and third group, personality traits are respectively any reactions and certain reactions.

Group Standards or Expectations

John Dewey writes that

> . . . . always and everywhere customs supply the standards for personal activities. They are the pattern into which individ-

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[1]"Family Tradition and Personality Development," NCSW, (1928), 330.

[2]"Cause and Prevention of Neuroses," JAP, XXIII (1928), 9.

> ual activity must weave itself . . . . because of present mobility and interminglings of customs, an individual is now offered an enormous range of custom-patterns, and can exercise personal ingenuity in selecting and re-arranging their elements . . . . . Customs in any case constitute moral standards. For they are active demands for certain ways of acting. Every habit creates an unconscious expectation.[1]

He describes in detail the mutual relation between group expectations and individual conduct in the following passage.

> Approbation and disapprobation are ways of influencing the formation of habits and aims; that is, of influencing future acts. The individual is held accountable for what he has done in order that he may be responsive in what he is going to do. Gradually persons learn by dramatic imitation to hold themselves accountable, and liability becomes a voluntary deliberate acknowledgment that deeds are our own, that their consequences come from us . . . . . The effect of custom on habit, and of habit upon thought is enough to prove this statement. When we begin to forecast consequences, the consequences that most stand out are those which will proceed from other people. The resistance and the co-operation of others is the central fact in the furtherance or failure of our schemes . . . . . All of the actions of an individual bear the stamp of his community. . . . . Difficulty in reading the stamp is due to variety of impressions in consequence of membership in many groups.[2]

The inculcation of group standards on the individual occurs through mutual experiences of individuals and the participation of individuals in social institutions. Thereby, the individual's impulses are shaped into dominant habits, and a trait becomes a function in the individual of group standards. In terms of motive, a trait is "an act plus a judgment upon some element of it." Disparity between traits and group expectations is minimized by intelligence which reorganizes traits.

E. Sapir shows by references to speech[3] and intelligence[4] that the traits of an individual must be judged in terms of the standards of his society. Illustrations of the relation between group practises and traits are the subdued breathing at a funeral,

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[1] Human Nature and Conduct (New York: H. Holt and Co., 1922), p. 75.

[2] Ibid., pp. 316 ff.

[3] "Speech as a Personality Trait," AJS, XXXII (1927), 892-905.

[4] Committee on Child Development, National Research Council, Fourth Conference on Research in Child Development (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933).

and the rapid breathing at a football game.

E. Wickman defines behavior as a socially evaluated and regularized product. In the investigation of children's behavior problems, he discovered that no single standard was equally serviceable to all groups (parents, teachers, administrators, etc.) in the evaluation of behavior. The relation between standards and traits is exemplified in the variations between teachers' and clincians' ratings.

> . . . . the most salient finding is the complete reversal in estimating the seriousness of the problems describing the withdrawing, recessive personality and behavior traits. Whereas teachers considered shyness, sensitiveness, unsocialness, fearfulness, dreaminess among the least serious of all problems, the clinicians ranked them together with unhappiness, depression and easily discouraged, resentfulness, physical coward, suggestible, and overcritical, at the very top of the list as the most serious problems. These items in the mental hygienists' ratings completely replace the problems relating to sex, dishonesty, and disobedience which the teachers ranked as most serious.[1]

F. Perrin and D. Klein[2] give three characteristics of a personality trait. First, it is a stimulus-response tendency that an individual manifests habitually and generally. A person is consistently hypersensitive, witty, etc. Second, it is a specific behavior tendency, i.e., a particular stimulus-response. For instance, cleverness is a general term that denotes diverse traits when applied to an individual on different occasions. Thirdly, it is a social value. The pupillary reflex is not a trait though a peculiar habit of winking is, because it attracts favorable or unfavorable attention.

W. Cowley[3] accounts for the variety of traits among leaders by the diverse judgments in different situational requirements.

W. Blatz and H. Bott state concretely the relation between standards and traits in the following quotations.

> It would seem to us that the standards which the home atmosphere conveys in respect of honesty, truthfulness, and respect, and consideration for others are of the greatest importance to the social development of the child. Needless to say these complex relationships are not inborn in the individual but are built up through a 'give and take' process

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[1] Children's Behavior and Teachers' Attitudes (New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1928), p. 126.

[2] Psychology (New York: H. Holt and Co., 1926), pp. 363 f.

[3] "Three Distinctions in the Study of Leadership," JAP, XXIII (1928), 144-157.

> of learning . . . . . The child will know whether we are honest or not without our telling him. He will find this out from our treatment of others, but much more from our treatment of him.[1]
> . . . . the pre-school child may learn that you get things by waiting your turn in the nursery school, but by kicking and screaming at home. The school age child may have one code of honesty and truthfulness in dealing with the teacher and another in his relations with the gang.[2]

E. Faris defines traits of personality as "descriptive terms denoting the developmental aspect which describes the behavior of the person in respect to the expectations, purposes, and prohibitions of the group in which he lives."[3]

The acts and gestures of an individual acquire meanings as traits from the responses by others. Since an individual participates usually in a multiple number of groups,[4] his traits are related ordinarily to a variety of group responses.

> The groups to which a person may belong are sometimes widely different and sometimes sharply conflicting in their demands and a given personality trait that may be assumed to be social may be traced to group experience in another or in a prior group wholly foreign to the association in which the personality is at a given moment found. And it must be remembered that social relations include not only what is said and done to the person and what he answers and does in return but must include that larger series of social relations represented in the literature he reads, the pictures he sees, and in the various artistic products with which he has had experience.[5]

Personality traits are not structures that are repaired or altered by group standards. Instead, they are functions of group mores. Changes in the mores or standards create personality traits.

L. Wirth implies a conception of personality trait in his discussions of the integral relation between culture and misconduct,[6] and personality type.[7] In the latter discussion, he says

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[1] Management of Young Children (New York: Wm. Morrow and Co., 1930), pp. 172 f.

[2] Ibid., p. 63.

[3] "Standpoint and Methods of Sociology in the Study of Personality and Social Growth," Fourth Conference on Research in Child Development, Appendix C, p. 2.

[4] "Nature of Human Nature," PASS, XX (1926), 15-29.

[5] "Standpoint and Methods, etc.," pp. 5-6.

[6] "Culture Conflict and Misconduct," SF, IX (1931), 490.

[7] "Some Characteristics of the Sociological Approach to

that

> In most communities and social worlds it has been found that not only are such types recognized but that names for them exist and that the members of the group are able to give a characterization of the personality that lies behind each lable. The types generally represent a fair estimate of the range of possibilities that a given culture offers to its members, of the values and judgments it attaches to the roles, and of the traits that are associated with each.[1]

If there are no favorable sets of attitudes or standards in a cultural group for particular traits, they will not appear in the conduct of members of such a group.[2] The identification of a particular trait with a particular standard is not always demonstrable, however, because an individual participates usually in groups that have conflicting standards. Partial identification can be established through an analysis of life history documents that disclose the acquisition of group standards and the re-organization of them in an individual's personality traits.

Two writers who give definitions in this group make minor comments that do not co-incide with their major emphases. Sapir refers to unit traits that exist independently of standards. Wickman suggests that there is probably some correlation between the teachers' reports and the real exhibition of behavior traits as if the latter were known without standards.

Dewey, Faris, and Wirth see the implications of their definitions. They recognize that standards and traits are experiences and that the connection between them is not easily demonstrated quantitatively. The nature of, and the relation between, standards and traits can be known only through experiences in different groups. Where direct participation is impossible, life history documents become valuable in the partial reproduction of the intricate relation between group expectations and personality traits. In addition, life history documents portray the role of individuality and private standards in the interpretation and reorganization of group expectations.

The principle differences between the definitions in

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to Personality," Fourth Conference on Research in Child Development.

[1] Ibid., p. 10.

[2] "Some Jewish Types of Personality," Urban Community (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1926), pp. 110 f.

this group and in previous groups are (1) that traits are not solely physiological (cf. first group); (2) that traits are not restricted to certain social experiences (cf. third group); (3) that traits are not only individual reactions (cf. second group) but also group reactions; (4) that traits are not inevitably permanent or general (cf. groups one and three); and (5) that traits are not solely external acts (cf. some definitions in groups one and two).

Specificity

W. Trow conducted experiments on decision[1] and confidence[2] which demonstrate the specificity of traits. A person who makes quick decisions in one situation does not make quick decisions in other situations. Similarly, a person's confidence varies in different situations. Upon the basis of such evidences, he concludes that all character traits are specific.

H. Hartshorne and M. May state concisely their belief in the specificity of traits.

> In Volumes I and II we made clear the specific nature of any one type of conduct, such as honesty or self-control, showing that these are descriptive terms to be applied to any one instance of behavior rather than to general traits. As abstractions, they properly signify standards or general concepts. They do not represent empirical organizations of units of conduct characteristic of the individual behavior of children, for such unified trends or traits are not to be found.[3]

> Stated in a very extreme fashion, the contrast between this theory and the inner mechanism theory is that the situational theory holds that when the situation is varied, the response is varied, even though the inner mechanisms remain constant, whereas the inner mechanism theory holds that when the inner urges or motives or instincts, or what not, are varied the conduct is varied even though the external circumstances remain the same. But here again the questions at issue are not settled because the necessary facts are unavailable.[4]

These co-authors obtained low correlations on the traits, honesty, charity, co-operation, inhibition, and persistence, in

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[1]"Trait Consistency and Speed of Decision," SS, XXI (1925), 542.

[2]"Psychology of Confidence," AP, X (1923), 39.

[3]Studies in the Nature of Character (New York: Macmillan Co., 1930), 143.

[4]"Foundations of Personality," Psychology at Work (New York: McGraw, Hill Book Co., 1932), p. 97.

tests that were given to pupils in a variety of situations. Although they tested a sixth of each pupil's behavior, they remark that two samplings would have determined whether or not traits are unified behavior trends. In the extremes of the bell curve distribution, they found a few children who were consistently honest or dishonest. These cases do not alter the conclusions because, according to these co-authors, honesty refers to conduct rather than characteristics of a person. They reiterate that they dealt only with conduct. Motives were ignored.

In a symposium on personality definitions, May gives a different presentation of personality traits.

> Personality traits are usually viewed as response values, but they also have stimulus value. For example, if an individual assumes an air of superiority and impresses others as refusing to associate with them, he is said to be snobbish. But his snobbishness is not something that he possesses but rather something that is inferred from the way he carried his cane, or wears his necktie or speaks to others. Others react in a more or less unified and similar manner to certain of his responses or to his appearance or presence and these responses of others are taken (or rather mistaken) for traits possessed by him. His traits are not possessed by him but are in fact his constant stimulus values.[1]

W. Hughes[2] thinks that personality traits vary in unlike situations. The variability is, however, within a narrow range.

K. Young[3] and G. Schwesinger[4] survey the literature on traits and conclude that traits are specific rather than general manifestations of behavior.

P. Young who criticizes the use of personality traits by social workers subscribes to the specificity of traits in the following quotation.

> . . . . the necessity for inferring the presence or absence of the trait from the actual behavior which, as observed, is a physical matter and . . . . the fact that traits are so closely related to the situation that the generalization of the trait is a matter of uncertainty. One is intelligent, honest, truthful, energetic, and so on under certain conditions and it is important to know the conditions which call forth the trait. Failure to state these conditions may lead

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[1] American Psychiatric Association, op. cit., p. 152.

[2] "Relation of Intelligence to Trait Characteristics," JEP, XVII (1926), 482-494.

[3] "Measurement of Personal and Social Traits," PASS, XXI (1926), 92-105.

[4] Heredity and Environment (New York: Macmillan Co., 1933).

to erroneous judgments of the behavior of the individual.[1]

The evaluation of the definitions in this group will begin with the viewpoint of Hartshorne and May. Their conclusion that traits are specific is a one-sided interpretation because the data show that generality and specificity of conduct exist respectively in the pupils who are represented on the extremes and middle portion of the frequency distribution curve.

In his own definition, May separates erroneously (1) actions and inferences; and (2) stimuli and responses. Snobbishness is inferred from actions but it does not exist independently of them. An individual who has those actions possesses also the trait of snobbishness. Secondly, B's response is not merely the value of A's stimulus, but is also the value of B to A. In responding to A, B responds to himself because he responds to himself as others respond to him. Responses or traits are collectively created and maintained. Each individual's responses or actions are representations of mutual responses. Consequently, the statement that an individual does not possess his traits is meaningless. Incidentally, May makes no mention of specificity in his definition of trait.

Most writers in this group identify specificity with mutability of traits. Trow refers simultaneously to the variability and specificity of confidence. K. Young accepts in his article the modifiability and specificity of traits but endorses in his book[2] the fixation of fundamental traits by the age of five. Schwesinger combines specificity and mutability though she regards temperament as permanent. P. Young, and Hartshorne and May imply the mutability of traits in their discussions of specificity.

The definitions in this group are unlike those of other groups except for some definitions in the second and fourth groups that allow for the specificity of traits.

Non-Existence of Personality Trait

With the exception of one article,[3] that suggests indeci-

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[1] Interviewing in Social Work (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1935), pp. 249 f.

[2] Social Psychology (New York: Crofts and Co., 1930), p. 237.

[3] "Notes on Rating," Journal of Applied Psychology, IX (1925), 188-195.

sion, P. Symonds denies the existence of the concept of personality trait. "Whereas habits are elements of experience and have a certain degree of reality we are never sure of the reality or existence of traits, nor of their definitions."[1] He encourages the investigation of conduct habits and specific reactions to clearly defined situations but discourages discussions of character traits, personality types, and attitudes.[2] In a recent book, he writes that

> Psychology has suffered grievously in the past from an exuberance of imagination on the part of its builders which has led them to create concepts with no corresponding reality as proved by their demolition by later experimentation. Hypostatization is the name the logicians give to this fallacy. The whole faculty psychology was erected by assigning a reality, concreteness, and independence to certain concepts of mental life that subsequent investigation shows do not have a corresponding independent existence. Likewise the present trait psychology is under the very strongest suspicion of being similarly unfounded.[3]

Symonds rejects in nominalistic style the universality or generality of traits, and defends the particularity or specificity of reactions and experiences. There is, however, no experience which is per se universal or particular. The universal is the experiential aspects which are selected for future experiences. The particular is the experiential phases which are dropped. There is no absolute procedure in the selection of the universal or particular. Every experience has an immediate and a future value. An immediate experience is neither consistent nor inconsistent, organized nor unorganized, general nor specific, permanent nor temporal. It is a participation. It can be further described only in terms of subsequent experience. Hence, universality, particularity, generality, specificity, etc., exist with reference to future experience. In other words, the universal exists within the developing process of experience. It mediates experiences so that continuity in conduct is possible.

Symonds refutes not only the universality or generality but also the specificity of traits. It is surprising that he does not accept the latter because he approves of habits that are

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[1]"Present Status of Character Measurement," JEP, XV (1924), 486.

[2]"What is an Attitude?" PB, XXIV (1927).

[3]Diagnosing Personality and Conduct (New York: Macmillan Co., 1931), p. 22.

specific reactions. Evidently, he dislikes the word, trait.

Symonds and G. Allport agree with each other that linguistic concepts and reality are not identical, but Symonds does not accept the generality of neurological integrations or traits. Symonds and Hartshorne and May believe in the specificity of reactions, but Symonds refuses to call them traits.

Generality or Specificity

Frank N. Freeman[1] attributes generality to the personality traits that belong in the categories of will temperament, emotional temperament, and moral disposition, and specificity to the traits that belong in the category of aesthetic sensibility. In illustration of will temperament traits, an individual reacts energetically or weakly, promptly or slowly, carefully or recklessly to surrounding stimuli. In traits of aesthetic sensibility, an individual may appreciate beauty in music but not in architecture.

E. Bogardus[2] thinks that personal behavior patterns (traits) are either tendencies toward consistent action (generality of trait) e.g., leadership,[3] or specific reactions in dissimilar social situations. Both characteristics were discovered by social distance tests.[4]

P. Valentine[5] describes general and specific traits. The former are the traits of an individual that friends know and remember. They are the major integrations of conduct. The latter occur in unlike situations, and are implied in affirmations of the non-predictability of individual conduct.[6]

A Jersild[7] includes resistance, negativism, ascendance,

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[1] "Tests of Personality Traits," SR, XXXIII (1925), 95-106.

[2] "Personality and Occupational Attitudes," SSR, XII (1927), 73-79.

[3] "Leadership and Social Situations." SSR, XVI (1931), 164 ff.

[4] Fundamentals of Social Psychology (New York: Century Co., 1931), pp. 97 ff.

[5] Psychology of Personality (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1932).

[6] For additional discussion of Valentine's viewpoint, see p. 115.

[7] Child Psychology (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1933).

submission, confidence, generosity, co-operativeness, and deceit, among the specific traits or meaningful activities that are acquired in situations. Intelligence is a general trait that is consistently expressed in all situations.

J. Folsom[1] defines a trait as any phase of behavior or bodily structure that distinguishes individuals from one another, e.g., physique (height, weight); general intelligence; temperament (emotional excitability); attitudes (radicalism); and special ability or skill (tennis). A trait is also general, e.g., quickness, or specific, e.g., quickness of temper.[2]

The definitions of this group have one common feature, namely, the generality or specificity of traits. In other respects, they are unlike, but not one can be indubitably allocated to another group. Freeman and Jersild think that certain traits are always general or specific. Bogardus, Valentine, and Folsom think that a trait can alternate between generality and specificity. All of these writers differ among themselves in the explanation[3] of generality and specificity, as well as in the association of permanency and changeability respectively with generality and specificity.

Unique Traits

T. Kelley gives the following characteristics of a type trait. " . . . . first, that a direct or indirect quantitative measure of it exists; second, that the trait exists in homogeneous age groups or in adult groups in amounts which correlate to the extent zero with other measured type traits; and finally, that it is this fact of zero correlation between two or more mental traits which stamps them as type traits."[4] Illustrations are social service, dominance, and equilibrium. Most individuals are admixtures though some individuals express distinct type traits.

C. Hull[5] describes group factors or aptitude determiners that are constant though they function in numerous activities

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[1] Social Psychology (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1931).

[2] In an earlier writing, he argues solely for the specificity of traits.

[3] See next chapter.

[4] "Oddities in Mental Make-Up," SS, XXIV (1926), 530.

[5] Aptitude Testing (Yonkers-on-Hudson:World Book Co.,1928).

that are specific variables.

D. Paterson says that " . . . . the theory of unique traits is that personality adjustments reflect, in varying proportions, the operation of relatively independent traits."[1] A unique trait has two characteristics. First, it correlates positively with some other criteria of human behavior, and secondly, it yields low correlations with other unique traits. Both characteristics are demonstrated in mechanical ability. It shows high correlations with outside criteria, and low correlations with mental ability, age, motor agility, height, weight, etc. On the basis of this discovery, Paterson deduces

> . . . . that the intercorrelations are low leads to the presumption that specific factors rather than a single general factor characterize mechanical ability. Slight, but consistent indications appeared that group factors might be present . . . . Here, tests were excluded in accordance with the principles of Spearman. Failure under these conditions to find evidence for a hierarchy, either when the tests were ranked according to the size of their correlations with intelligence tests or according to the average of all their correlations with other mechanical ability tests, was regarded as evidence making a general factor in mechanical ability improbable. On the other hand, the presence of seven perfect hierarchies of four tests each, which became increasingly imperfect as other tests were added to them, was regarded as evidence pointing to the presence of group factors.[2]

The theory of unique traits opposes principally the theory of C. Spearman.[3] He asserts that there is a general factor "g" in all mental abilities. It varies by individuals but remains individually constant. There are also specific factors "s" that are modifiable. He likens the "g" to the energy in locomotives and the "s" to particular operating engines. In addition, he thinks that there are other universal factors, e.g., perseveration (basis of quickness or originality); oscillations of mental efficiency (manifestations of fatigue); and self-control[4] (basis of differences in profoundness and common sense). His adherents

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[1] Physique and Intellect (New York: Century Co., 1930), pp. 276 f.

[2] Minnesota Mechanical Ability Tests (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1930), pp. 243 f.

[3] Abilities of Man (New York: Macmillan Co., 1927).

[4] "New Method for Investigating the Springs of Action," Feelings and Emotions--Wittenberg Symposium (Worcester: Clark University Press, 1928), p. 46.

include N. Carey,[1] J. Garnett,[2] C. Burt,[3] E. Webb.[4]

The proponents of unique traits deny the existence of any universal factors. They contend that there are only permanent group factors that are relatively independent of one another. Each pervades a group of modifiable, specific factors.

Although the theory of unique traits is distinct, it resembles partly other definitions, namely the generality and permanency of groups one and three; the specificity and changeability of group five; and the generality and specificity of group seven.

Psychological Abstractions

P. Valentine,[5] M. Follett,[6] and William McDougall[7] describe successively the abstract nature of traits in the following quotations.

> It must be remembered, also, that the traits themselves are but abstractions, and not actual and persistent units in the personality.

> As we have found that a sensation never exists in experience but is a psychological abstraction, that a 'trait' of personality is also a psychological abstraction, so many times our studies reveal to us that the meaning of a social situation is to be found not in its elements viewed separately but only in the total situation.

> The moral qualities are abstractions; and we can think of them, can conceive them clearly, only by the aid of language, we need a name for each quality that we would distinguish . . . . . The main source of confusion is the fact that we commonly use these words with reference to the facts of outward behavior which we can so easily observe and describe; whereas they can only be properly used when we have knowledge of the motives that underlie the observed behavior.

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[1] "Factors in the Mental Processes of School Children," BJP, VIII (1915), 182.

[2] "General Ability, Cleverness and Purpose," BJP, IX (1917), 345 ff.

[3] Young Delinquent (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1925), p. 484.

[4] "Character and Intelligence," BJPMS, I (1915), 32 ff.

[5] Op. cit., p. 78.

[6] Creative Experience (New York: Longmans Green and Co., 1924), p. 114.

[7] Character and the Conduct of Life (New York: G. Putnam's Sons, 1927), p. 163.

Since one can hardly think of anything which does not involve in some manner an abstraction, these writers do not clearly differentiate trait from other concepts. They imply that traits are concept words, that traits are the general or common aspect of activities, that specific reactions are not traits, and that physiological patterns are not traits. It should be remembered, however, that trait words are created in activity, and that they refer to activity. Traits and activities do not exist separately. Furthermore, traits function universally and particularly. The generality of a trait implies specificity, and vice versa.

The definitions of this group contrast with other definitions. Symonds denies the reality of a personality trait because it is a psychological abstraction. G. Allport recognizes the existence of linguistic traits (social or moral evaluations) but maintains that the real personality traits are neurological patterns. C. Landis and K. Lashley[1] discovered no physiological pattern for emotionality, but concede its existence as a social concept or abstraction. They think, however, that the real traits are specific physical reactions. Hartshorne and May found no persistent unified behavior and conclude that traits are specific reactions. They grant that general traits exist as social concepts or abstractions but do not regard them as the real personality traits.

In retrospect, personality trait does not denote the same thing for all writers. This is indicated prominently among the nine categories of definitions. Within a single category where definitions are similar, disagreements arise in the elaborations of the formal statements.

Some definitions that convey a broad and formal meaning are probably formulated prior to the investigation of problems. Other definitions are apparently formulations that are based upon the study of particular problems. In fact, such definitions contain the principle conclusions of the research.

Collectively, the definitions of personality trait point to a variety of personality traits. For instance, intelligence, temperament, and will are included in some definitions but are excluded from other definitions. The range of inclusion extends from practically everything (cf. definitions in group two) to

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[1] Dynamics of Behavior (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932).

nothing (cf. viewpoint of group five).

Finally, the definitions direct attention to a diversity of problems, as well as, to multiple answers to each problem. The nature of, and answers to, these problems of personality trait will be considered in the subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER IV

MAJOR PROBLEMS[1]

The major problems of personality trait are mutability and specificity. Many writers do not distinguish between them, and consequently, the nature of each is not always understood. These problems will be presented separately so that the discernment of each may be facilitated.

Mutability

The materials are organized into answers to questions. First, what are the attitudes of writers to this problem? Second, how do writers explain the mutability or permanency of traits? Answers to the first question are classified and will be presented as follows: (1) permanency of traits; (2) permanency of some traits; (3) mutability of traits; (4) potential, if not actual, mutability of all traits; (5) relative permanence of traits; and (6) mutability of traits within permanent limits.

Permanence of traits.--Some writers affirm the permanency of particular traits that they have studied. They make no commitments regarding the permanency of other traits. Other writers assert that all traits are permanent.

H. Zoepffel[2] observes among infants a constancy of individual differences in slowness, dullness, quickness, amiableness, laughing, and crying. R. Washburn[3] notices no changes in smiling and laughing among babies. Blanton[4] cites cases of the permanency

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[1]Some writers who have not employed the concept of personality trait are included because they give the best formulations of viewpoints on mutability, etc., that some writers use in their discussions of personality traits.

[2]"Ein Versuch zur Experimentellen Feststellung der Personlichkeit in Sauglinsalter," ZP, III (1929), 273 ff.

[3]"Study of the Smiling and Laughing of Infants in the First Year of Life," GPM, VI (1929), 397 ff.

[4]Smiley Blanton and Margaret Gray, Child Guidance (New York: Century Co., 1927), p. 43.

of restlessness and anxiety. E. Jones[1] concludes that the conservative and reactionary attitudes of students are permanent. D. Paterson[2] proves the permanency of mechanical ability.

G. Allport argues for the stability and persistence of personality traits in many passages[3] of his latest writing. He offsets the argument in some places[4] by a defense of personality changes. Then, in a few paragraphs,[5] he contends that nature sets limits to variations; that change can occur only within a certain range. F. Allport expounds the physiological permanency of traits. Plant thinks that the permanent responses to the most varied stimuli are the principle characteristic of a trait. Howard and Patry accept the permanency of the basic patterns, and interpret apparent changes as the shifting of elements upon an unchanged foundation. Kelley emphasizes the persistency of type or unique traits. Gates traces the continuity of instinctive tendencies in acquired habits.

The following writers date the permanency of traits from a specific age: C. Bühler[6] (second half of the first year); Baldwin[7] (second year); Lucas[8] and J. Taft[9] (third year); Jones[10]

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[1] "Opinions of College Students," Journal of Applied Psychology, X (1926), 427-436.

[2] Minnesota Mechanical Ability Tests.

[3] Personality--A Psychological Interpretation, pp. ix, 3, 53, 107, 124, 125, 339, 353, 411-413, 471, 506. On pp. 128, 130, 159, he identifies permanence or persistence with consistency or generality.

[4] Ibid., pp. 13, 20 f., 48, 125, 151, 152, 206, 312, 560.

[5] Ibid., pp. 102, 346, 347.

[6] "Personality Types Based on Experiments with Children," NICP, IX (1931), 100.

[7] B. Cunningham (ed.), "Is a Child Made or Unmade: A Symposium," Children (December, 1926), p. 8.

[8] Ibid.

[9] "Effect of an Unsatisfactory Mother-Daughter Relationship Upon the Development of a Personality," Family, VII (1926), 15.

[10] B. Weill, Behavior of Young Children of the Same Family (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1928), p. 16.

fourth year); Adler,[1] Freud,[2] J. Beard,[3] and Watson[4] (fifth year; Watson gives the ages two and thirty in other references); Stecher,[5] A. Gesell,[6] and Richardson[7] (sixth year); Jung,[8] Terman,[9] Hall,[10] Hamilton,[11] White,[12] and Burgess[13] (early childhood); and William Ogburn[14] (college age).

Permanency of some traits.--The writers in this group accept the permanency of some traits and the changeability of other traits. Hull posits the permanency of group factors and the changeability of specific factors. Spearman calculates the fixity of universal factors and the variability of specific factors. Hollingworth attributes permanency to individual traits, and changeability to situational traits. Brandenburg accepts the permanency of the character traits in personality and the alterability of all other personality traits. Kitson holds that intelligence is constant, and that industriousness, neatness, patience, assertiveness, affability, etc., are inconstant. William McDougall[15]

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[1] Psychologies of 1930, p. 403.

[2] Introductory Lectures in Psychoanalysis (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1922), p. 298.

[3] "Mental Adjustment in College Students," SS, XXXII (1930), 475.

[4] Cunningham, op. cit. [5] Weill, op. cit.

[6] Infancy and Human Growth (New York: Macmillan Co., 1928).

[7] Weill, op. cit.

[8] Contributions to Analytical Psychology (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1928), p. 322.

[9] "Preliminary Study in the Psychology and Pedagogy of Leadership," PS, XI (1904), 443.

[10] "Some Aspects of the Early Sense of Self," AJP, IX (1897), 351-395.

[11] "Mental Hygiene and the Parasite. How Habits Are Formed from Earliest Infancy through Preschool Years," MH, V (1921), 46.

[12] "Childhood: Golden Period for Mental Hygiene," MH, IV (1920), 257.

[13] Shaw, The Jack-Roller, p. 190.

[14] "Non-Intellectual Aspects of Personality Facing Education," Educational Record, XVI (1935), 293.

[15] Character and the Conduct of Life, pp. 168 ff.

states that disposition, intelligence, temperament, and temper are little modified by training though character is decidedly altered by it. In another writing,[1] he maintains that the afferent and motor aspects of instincts are modifiable but that the conative part is permanent. Valentine ascribes permanency to elemental traits (pitch discrimination, memory of digits, etc.), intelligence, temperamental qualities, and undescribed weak traits, and changeability to all other traits. L. Ezekiel[2] finds no significant changes in egocentric nursery children but observes striking changes in unaggressive children. Jersild believes that ability and early manifested traits are permanent though he cites cases of nursery school children whose traits changed. Snedden thinks that some traits are utilized throughout life and that others are supplanted by new traits. Blatz and Bott contend that the basic patterns are detectable in all of an individual's behavior despite the fact that they cite some nursery school cases that show the mutability of traits.

Mutability of traits.--Some writers refer to the modifiability of traits that they have investigated. Other writers support the changeability of all traits.

Trow concludes from his study of confidence that it varies with situations. G. Eichler[3] improved social leadership among pupils in the ninth and twelfth grade by direct instruction. L. Jack and associates[4] analyzed the behavior of preschool children and found that assertiveness, aggressiveness, social responsiveness, etc. are mutable. M. Walsh[5] compared nursery and non-nursery school children who were similar in age, intelligence, general physical development, and home backgrounds. At the end of six months, the nursery school children were less inhibited;

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[1] Introduction to Social Psychology (Boston: J. Luce and Co., 1914), p. 29.

[2] "Changes in Egocentricity of Nursery School Children," CD, II (1931), 74 f.

[3] "Studies in Student Leadership," Abstracts of Studies in Education (State College: Pennsylvania State College, 1935), pp.13 f.

[4] Behavior of the Preschool Child (Iowa City: University of Iowa Studies, 1934), IX, No. 3.

[5] "Relation of Nursery School Training to the Development of Certain Personality Traits," CD, II (1931), 72 f.

more socialized, spontaneous, self-assertive, independent, self-reliant, curious, etc. J. Maller[1] demonstrates the variableness of honesty. E. Hurlock and S. Sender[2] describe the negative phase (passivity, lack of co-operation and leadership) that is of short duration during the pubertal age in girls. P. Pigors[3] outlines distinct changes in the leadership traits of children. William Smith[4] compares American born Japanese and their foreign born parents. The former, in contrast to the latter, are individualistic, blunt and direct in greeting one another. A. Lind[5] interprets the mutability of affability, affection, indulgence and other temperamental qualities among Hawaiians. C. Johnson[6] describes personality changes among Negroes. C. Bird[7] traces the behavior changes of soldiers in different social situations, e.g., enlistment, camps, battlefields, hospitals, prisons,etc. W. Waller[8] reports temporary changes in practise teachers, and relatively permanent changes in regularly employed teachers. The former include growth of self-confidence, dreams of discipline, supervision, and teaching. The latter include authoritative attitude, decrease in phantasy, etc. H. Koch and H. Streit[9] measured the activeness of pre-school children, and conclude that it varies with situations. A. Brubacher[10] refers to changes in leadership when an

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[1] Self-Marking Test (New York: Columbia University, 1930).

[2] "'Negative Phase' in Relation to the Behavior of Pubescent Girls," CD, I (1930), 325-340.

[3] "Leadership and Domination Among Children," Sociologus, IX (1933), 143.

[4] "Changing Personality Traits of Second Generation Orientals in America," AJS, XXXIII (1928), 922 f.

[5] E. Reuter (ed.), Race and Culture Contacts (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1934), p. 244.

[6] Ibid., p. 209.

[7] "From Home to the Charge: A Psychological Study of the Soldier," AJP, XXVIII (1917), 315 ff.

[8] "Personality Changes in Practice Teachers," PASS, XXVII (1933), 148 f.

[9] "Study in Rating Technique with Special Reference to Activity in Pre-School Children," PS, XLI (1932), 354 f.

[10] "Teaching Personality Quotient," Journal of Applied Psychology, V (1921), 41.

individual enrolls in college. P. Voelker[1] observed changes in trustworthiness among newly organized scout troops that received special training. A. Kornhauser[2] and S. Rice[3] found changes in liberal and conservative attitudes of college students. E. Riddle,[4] W. Moede,[5] and W. Burnham,[6] collectively discovered changes in aggressiveness, speed, accuracy, and efficiency which resulted from group competition. Bonham and Sargent[7] report changes in fretfulness, quietness, good-naturedness, and irritability in babies. W. Ruediger and G. Strayer[8] describe changes in the efficiency of teachers. H. Gerling[9] confirms changes in pupils' traits, e.g., self-reliance, self-control, initiative, courtesy, responsibility, co-operation, and industry. W. Poppelreuter,[10] and S. Sollier and J. Drabs[11] verify the changeability of occupational traits.

Freeman thinks that all traits, including intelligence,[12] are susceptible of change. M. Plumley[13] disproves the hypothesis

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[1] Function of Ideals and Attitudes in Social Education (New York: Columbia University, 1921), 123 ff.

[2] "Changes in Attitudes Resulting from a College Course in Economics," PB, XXV (1928), 206 ff.

[3] "Differential Changes of Political Preference Under Campaign Stimulation," JAP, XXI (1926), 301 f.

[4] "Aggressive Behavior in a Small Social Group," AP, (March, 1925), p. 13.

[5] Experimentelle Massenpsychologie (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1920), Partii.

[6] "Group as a Stimulus to Mental Activity," Science, XXXI (1921).

[7] Jersild, Child Psychology, pp. 345 f.

[8] "Qualities of Merit in Teachers," JEP, I (1910), 277.

[9] "Character Education," SS, XXXII (1930), 810.

[10] "Analyse der Erziehung zur Exaktheitsarbeit nach-experimental-psychologischer Methode," ZAP, XXIX (1927).

[11] "La Prevision de la perfectabilite des aptitudes motrices," RST, II (1929).

[12] Fourth Conference on Research in Child Development, Appendix H.

[13] "Comparative Study of Self and Friends' Ratings of Seventy-One Personality Traits," (Master's Thesis, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, March, 1934).

of Adler that personality traits are related to age position in the family. H. Hawthorn[1] says that personality is a set of processes and functions (traits) that vary irregularly. W. Hughes[2] remarks that personality traits are naturally variable. I. Wile[3] discovers no generic or permanent traits in children. Wickman believes that basic reaction patterns are always subject to change. Gilliland states that all traits, including intelligence, aggressiveness, sociability, personal appearance, and morality, are modifiable. L. Lowrey[4] maintains that behavior is always dynamic and changeable. Hicks[5] accepts the variability of traits because persons are continuously exposed to different social patterns.

Potential, if not actual, mutability of all traits.-- In the study of race attitudes, E. Bogardus[6] secured evidence of the permanence and impermanence of traits. W. Garnett[7] shows that the traits of individual farmers are persistent, as well as changeable. F. Goodenough[8] and M. Sherman grant the potential mutability of traits but think that some traits tend toward permanency. R. Allers[9] argues that the permanency of traits does not disprove their alterability. John Dewey gives a theoretical defense for the changeability and continuity of traits. Ellsworth Faris contends that the inertia of traits does not deny their mutability. Curti

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[1] "Methods of Studying Personality Development in Rural and Urban-Groups," PASS, XXIII (1928), 274-283.

[2] Op.cit.

[3] "Relation of Intelligence to Behavior," MH, X(1926),62-74.

[4] "Environmental Factors in the Behavior of Children," American Journal of Psychiatry, VI (1926), 227 ff.

[5] Fourth Conference on Research in Child Development, pp. 51 f.

[6] "Race Friendliness and Social Distance," SSR, XI (1927), 272-287.

[7] Rural Organizations in Relation to Rural Life in Virginia with Special Reference to Organizational Attitudes (Virginia Polytechnic Institute: Virginia Agricultural Experimental Station, 1927), Bulletin 256.

[8] "Inter-Relationships in the Behavior of Young Children," CD, I (1930), 39.

[9] Psychology of Character (New York: Macmillan Co., 1931), pp. 12 ff.

acknowledges the permanency of traits but maintains that they are susceptible of change. Anderson[1] observed that children of three and a half years varied in the changeability of their traits.

Relative permanence of traits.--Filter, Prince, Levy, Emmons, and others (principally in the second group of definitions) refer to typical reactions, characteristic behavior, etc. They intimate that traits are relatively permanent though they do not reject the possibility of deviations. The writers of the preceding group, on the other hand, stress change though they do not deny the possibility of permanence.

Mutability of traits within permanent limits.--W. White described recapitulatory changes within a pre-determined psychic life. E. Kretschmer[2] interprets similarly the variations in the individual's psychic apparatus. C. Stockard[3] believes that physiological conditions pre-determine alterations in personal behavior. P. Furfey[4] correlates traits with children's ages, C. Griffitts[5] and H. Burtt[6] account for individual variations by the ripening of successive instincts that are permanent. A. Gesell[7] explains fundamental behavior variations in terms of the maturation of inner compulsions or intrinsic physiological development. June Downey,[8] C. Bühler,[9] and Jones[10] employ the maturational theory

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[1]Dummer (ed.), Unconscious--A Symposium, pp. 79 f.

[2]Physique and Character (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1925), p. 252.

[3]Physical Basis of Personality (New York: W. Norton and Co., 1931), pp. 273-297.

[4]"Social and Physical Factors in Developmental Age," Fourth Conference on Research in Child Development, Appendix E, pp. 14 f.

[5]Fundamentals of Vocational Psychology (New York: Macmillan Co., 1924), pp. 332-338.

[6]Principles of Employment Psychology (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1926), p. 179.

[7]Guidance of Mental Growth in Infant and Child (New York: Macmillan Co., 1930), p. 322.

[8]Will-Temperament and Its Testing (Yonkers-on-Hudson: World Book Co., 1923), p. 327-333.

[9]First Year of Life (New York: John Day Co., 1930).

[10]C. Murchison (ed.), Handbook of Child Psychology (Worcester: Clark University Press, 1931), chap. iii. See also, C. Val-

in their respective studies of temperament, behavior of children, and fear. V. Anderson[1] believes that modifications of traits (intellectual, motor, temperament, self-expression, sociability) are constitutionally predetermined. Shirley posits a nuclear organic personality that limits trait changes and that determines the relative importance of traits. J. Piaget[2] describes the social development within the dominant pattern of egocentrism in the child's social world. When the child enters the adult's social world, his dominant pattern becomes objective and social.

To these classified answers, citations of trait changes at particular ages will be appended. They contrast with citations of trait fixations at particular ages (see p. 119). The subsequent writers are not in other respects a homogenous group because they differ with one another in the answers to both questions on this problem.

Childhood.--C. King[3] considers diffidence and talkativeness childhood defects that are outgrown. According to Bühler,[4] mastery of the simplest obstacles is absent in infancy but is acquired later. Jersild[5] notices the disappearance of resistant behavior after the fourth year. C. Morgan[6] states that self-regarding actions are supplanted by sympathetic impulses. E. Bryan[7] concludes that quiet, receptive behavior is replaced by aggressive behavior; that shame and modesty appear at the age of seven or eight; that selfishness, teasing, and bullying decline about this age; and that malingering develops after the age of eight. Wheeler and Perkins[8] include among the traits that are modified: self-

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entine, "Innate Basis of Fears," JGP, XXXVII (1930), 394 ff.

[1]"Psychiatric Guide for Employment," JPR, VI (1927), 417-441.

[2]Child's Conception of Physical Causality (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1930). Also, Language and Thought of the Child (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1926).

[3]"Vocational Guidance," EAS, IV (1918), 481.

[4]The First Year of Life (New York: John Day Co., 1930), p. 14.

[5]Op. cit., p. 353.

[6]Psychology for Teachers (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1898), pp. 223 ff.

[7]"Nascent Stages and Their Pedagogical Significance," PS, VII (1900), 364 ff.

[8]Op. cit., pp. 227 ff.

ishness, egotism, immediacy of goals, suggestibility, credulity, negativism, lack of inhibitions and affectation, imaginativeness, idealism, creativeness, and insight. S. Foster[1] mentions the disappearance of dependency.

Early Puberty.--C. Bühler[2] and H. Hetzer[3] report the appearance for a period from two to nine months of disinclination, restlessness, uneasiness, and irritability. Jaensch[4] describes eidetic imagery.

Adolescence.--According to Curti,[5] traits that are augmented or modified are: aggressiveness, moodiness, self-consciousness, shyness, and depression. Gilliland[6] says that childish things are discarded, and that the company of elders is sought though shyness is manifested in their presence. G. Neumann[7] thinks that nationalistic, imperialistic, and militaristic attitudes do not arise until the age of fourteen. C. Lombroso[8] thought that the stimulus for genius and profound development occurred at this age. Beard[9] designates emotional conflicts as the characteristic traits of this age. W. Forbush[10] re-states the traits that Hall assigned to adolescence. Terman[11] finds that a diffidence and self-assertion appear that are different from childhood bashfulness and egoism. Bell[12] states that new values are created which result in pronounced behavior changes. H. Blumer[13] names personal

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[1] "Personality Deviations and Their Relation to the Home," MH, IX (1925), 736.

[2] Zwei Madchentagebucher, Quellen und Studien zur Jugendkunde (Jena: G. Fischer, 1927), XII, 145.

[3] "Systematische Dauerbeobachtungen an Jugendlichen uber den Verlauf der Negativen Phase," ZPPEP, XXVIII (1927), 80 ff.

[4] C. Murchison (ed.), Handbook of Child Psychology, chap. xxi.

[5] Op. cit., p. 486. [6] Genetic Psychology, pp. 310 ff.

[7] Study of International Attitudes of High School Students (New York: Columbia University, 1926), p. 11.

[8] "Determining of Genius," Monist, XII (1901), 57.

[9] Op cit., p. 476.

[10] "Social Pedagogy of Boyhood," PS, VII (1900), 310.

[11] Op. cit., pp. 435 f.

[12] "A Study of the Teacher's Influence," PS, VII (1900), 524 f.

[13] Sociological Conference on Adolescence.

traits that arise in adjustments, e.g., heightened self-consciousness, sense of isolation, insecurity, emotional instability, indifference, defiance, and self-reliance. R. Cavan[1] refers to schizophrenia as a constellation of reactions and attitudes that rarely develop before adolescence.

Adulthood and senility.--E. Reuter[2] contrasts the traits of childhood, adolescence, and adulthood. Childhood traits are uncritical acceptance of inferior status, social dependence, submission to authority, emphasis upon the objective, external activities, and unconsciousness of self as a major interest. Adolescent traits include an absorbing wish for self-realization in the age-group, intense wish for participation in the age-group's activities, and a wish for recognition by the age-group. Adult traits are relative freedom from group dominance, as well as, from participation in, and approval of, some groups. Comparisons between the traits of children and adults are made by L. Bernard,[3] C. Judd,[4] M. Prince,[5] R. Park,[6] W. Stern,[7] and C. Campbell,[8] Systematic arrangements of traits that are typical of age periods from childhood to old age are given by W. Stern,[9] E. Groves,[10] and H. Hollingworth.[11] Senile traits are enumerated by J. Dorsey.[12]

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid.

[3] Introduction to Social Psychology (New York: H. Holt and Co., 1926), p. 332.

[4] "Early Emotions and Early Reactions as Related to Mature Character," SS, XXV (1927), 359 f.

[5] "Why We Have Traits," p. 428.

[6] K. Young (ed.), Social Attitudes (New York: H. Holt and Co., 1931), p. 36.

[7] Psychology of Early Childhood (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1924), pp. 437 ff.

[8] Human Personality and the Environment (New York: Macmillan Co., 1935), pp. 154-166.

[9] Die Differentielle Psychologie (Leipzig: J.A.Barth, 1921), pp. 337 ff.

[10] Personality and Social Adjustment (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1923), pp. 194 ff.

[11] Mental Growth and Decline (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1927), pp. 36 ff.

[12] Foundations of Human Nature (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1935), p. 209.

This completes the materials that are relevant to the answers of the first question. It should be obvious that the question whether personality traits are mutable cannot be answered by a single word, yes or no.

The answers[1] to the second question (How do writers explain the permanency or mutability of traits?) are arranged and will be given as follows: (1) organic inheritance; (2) maturation; (3) interaction of heredity and environment; (4) social experiences of childhood; (5) self, and group expectations; and (6) physical conditions. These answers are not absolutely distinct but rather they are emphases in explanations that show a gradual shift from organic inheritance to group expectations.

Organic Inheritance.--The hereditary explanation for the permanence of traits is based upon the early appearance and persistence of individual behavior in all environments. The exact nature and process of organic inheritance are undescribed by most writers in this group. No account is usually given of the hereditary acquisition or creation of traits. The phrase, "organic inheritance" is apparently regarded as sufficiently self-explanatory. The variety of evidence for this explanation is contained in the following materials.

M. Sayles[2] found that children react differently to similar experiences from the time of birth. She explains this fact by differential heredity.[3] M. Shirley observed directly the behavior of twenty-three babies for two years. During this time, she secured test results and observations which show the negligible effect of new experiences. The ineffectiveness of environment is illustrated by children who express traits that are not intentionally fostered by their parents. H. Lundholm[4] thinks that altro-

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[1]Writers who answer similarly the first question do not necessarily give similar answers to this question. Some writers are not mentioned in the answers to both questions because they give either their beliefs or restricted explanations. Many writers are cited in both sets of answers though a few who could be mentioned are omitted from one set in order to conserve space. It should be remembered that some writers endorse more than one answer in both sets of answers.

[2]Problem Child at Home (New York: Commonwealth Fund,1928), pp. vi f.

[3]See p. 145 for her explanation of personality changes.

[4]"Evolution of the Concept of the Altrocentric and the Egocentric Tendencies," ICP, pp. 293 f.

centric (extrospective, extroactive, altruistic) and egocentric (introspective, seclusive, egoistic) traits of adults are constitutionally predetermined because they appear in early childhood. The egoistic type who does not develop a social character lacks constitutionally the protective and submissive instincts. The altruistic type, on the other hand, possesses constitutionally these instincts. B. Glueck[1] says that the early appearance of the characteristic traits of the nervous child indicates that they are primarily, if not wholly, innate. In another writing,[2] he reaches similarly the conclusion that the traits of children are mainly hereditary. Jersild considers hereditary the individual differences in irascibility, resistance, docility, compliance, fear, and temperament because they appear early and persist indefinitely. In another section, he remarks that some permanent behavior patterns are acquired in childhood. Valentine, who follows Thorndike, accepts the hereditary permanence of elemental traits because they are not susceptible to training. Weill reproduces a case study of a person who has a neurotic constitution, and adds that such a person would be a problem in any environment because the characteristic is hereditary.

H. Woolley[3] proves by the consistency of test results from young children that placidity, content, restlessness, and fidgetiness are organically permanent. L. Terman[4] verifies the organic permanence of intelligence by the constancy of results in repeated tests of individual ability. Paterson perceives no effect of favorable environments upon the mechanical ability of individuals. Environment refers to the father's occupation, economic status, educational training of family members, individual's special training in mechanical ability, etc. J. Stenquist[5] and J. Cox[6] reach the same conclusion regarding the nature of

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[1]"Nervous Child," Survey,(November, 1923), p. 185.

[2]"Significance of Parental Attitudes for the Destiny of the Individual," MH, XII (1928), 726.

[3]"Psychogenic Factor in Relation to Age," ICP, pp. 493 f.

[4]Measurement of Intelligence (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1916), pp. 116 ff.

[5]Measurements of Mechanical Ability (New York: Columbia University Press, 1923).

[6]Mechanical Aptitude (London: Methuen and Co., 1928).

mechanical ability. S. House[1] establishes the hereditary persistence of emotional instability by the sameness in results of successive tests on individuals. Spearman and Hull have amassed extensive statistical data from tests which show the hereditary permanence respectively of universal and group factors.

A. Diefendorf[2] accounts for the lack of sympathy, kindness, ambition, and the persistence of cunning, deceit, and callousness in criminals, respectively, by the absence and presence of such inborn behavior. C. Burt[3] who studies delinquency through tests and observations concludes that the following traits are innate: intelligence, attention, memory, imagination, verbal facility, manual dexterity, general emotionality, timidity, special instincts, and emotions. E. Kretschmer[4] defines temperament as emotional constitution and mental sensitivity. These are due to organic inheritance and glandular activity. The person of cycloid temperament is always sociable, friendly, and amiable with periodic oscillations into sorrowful moods. The three sub-types of the cyclothymic temperament manifest respectively the traits of cheerfulness and liveliness; realism and humor; and melancholy. The person of schizoid temperament is autistic, shy, and serious. The sub-types of the schizothymic temperament range from hypersensitive persons to dull persons with a middle group of cool, active, consistent and systematic men.

Schwesinger, Kitson, R. Paynter,[5] and Brandenburg endorse the hereditary explanation of permanent traits on the evidence that other persons submit.

A few writers explain trait changes between parents and offspring by organic inheritances. Kretschmer accounts for mixture types in the offspring by the inheritance of different components from the parents. Pronounced changes are due to the rivalry among genotypal factors. Kelley uses the concepts of bio-

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[1] "Mental Hygiene Inventory," AP (May, 1927), No. 88.

[2] Clinical Psychiatry (New York: Macmillan Co., 1915), pp. 517-519.

[3] Young Delinquent (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1925), pp. 401 ff.

[4] Psychology of Men of Genius (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1921), pp. 52 ff.

[5] "Humanizing Psychology in the Study of Behavior Problems in Children," SS, XXIV (1926), 567 ff.

logical variation and selection in the explanation of trait changes between generations.[1] With the exception of the writers in the next group answer, organic inheritance is not used in the explanation of trait changes during an individual's life.

Maturation.--This explanation embraces the specific theories of recapitulation,[2] instincts, maturation, and parallel physical and mental development.

For William McDougall, instincts antedate mechanisms that are the instruments of activity.[3] They are in the behavior of man and lower animals, and in an exaggerated form in the insane. In other words, they are universal. Appropos to their universality, McDougall remarks that everywhere a smile provokes a responsive smile; pain and sorrow elicit pity; and laughter evokes laughter. His original list of instincts included fear, repulsion, pugnacity, curiosity, self-abasement, self-assertion, parental love, reproduction, gregariousness, emulation, acquisitiveness, and hunger. Each had a specific emotional accompaniment.

The instincts do not ripen simultaneously, but rather, mature in a prescribed order. Sucking and wailing are expressed shortly after birth, and some develop relatively late when intelligent control of them is possible. Complications in the development of instincts are (1) natural excitement by ideas of particular objects, as well as, by ideas of other objects; (2) indefinite modification of instinctive bodily movements; (3) simultaneous excitation of several instincts by the complexity of ideas; and (4) systematization into sentiments.

Permanency of behavior is manifested from generation to generation, and in the individual's predetermined, especially conative, behavior. Mutability is expressed in the new behavior that accompanies the maturation of instincts, and in the motor and afferent behavior.

Instinctivists who endorse this viewpoint of McDougall include Watts, Griffitts, Burtt, and others.

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[1] See also Davenport and others, pp. 40 ff.

[2] See writers in chap. ii who employ the recapitulation theory. Other writers include Rosanoff, Kretschmer, White, etc.

[3] For Woodworth, instincts are the mechanisms of human activity. It is surprising how many writers discuss personality trait problems in terms of instincts, as well as personality trait.

A. Gesell expounds the maturational theory. He writes that

> The environment furnishes the foil and milieu for the manifestation of development, but these manifestations come from inner compulsion and are primarily organized by inherent inner mechanics and by an intrinsic physiology of development. The very plasticity of growth requires that there be limiting and regulatory mechanisms. Growth is a process so intricate, and so sensitive, that there must be powerful stabilizing factors, intrinsic rather than extrinsic, which preserve the balance of the total pattern and the direction of the growth trend. Maturation is, in a sense, a name for this regulatory mechanism.[1]

The hereditary characteristics[2] include tempo, trend, temperament, prominent marks of individuality, physical mobility, social alertness, perception of the mood of others, general emotional equipment, and specific abilities (drawing, music, early facility in language, precocity in the use of generalizations and abstractions). These are permanent except for maturational changes. Conditioning (external training) provides only the content of these dynamic patterns. In terms of fear, maturation determines the modes of fear and conditioning determines the objects of fear. Again, permanency is expressed in the continuity of intrinsic development, and basic changes are restricted to modifications that inhere in the maturational process. Superficial changes exist in the field of conditioning.

The following cases exemplify Gesell's theory. A baby[3] illustrates emotional maturation. At ten weeks of age, she is entirely complaisant when put in a shut-in environment. At twenty weeks, she shows a mild tolerance. At thirty weeks, she displays a robust disquietude by crying. In another illustration, twins are observed from birth for several months. They differ consistently from each other owing to dissimilar organic inheritances, in placidity, length of crying, vigor of protest, tolerance of physical discomfort, readiness to smile, and social responsiveness. These differences persist though they have the same home, mother, similar health, etc.

June Downey assumes that temperament traits are permanent

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[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 322.

[2] "Educational Status of the Pre-School Child," SS, XXXIX (1934), 497 f.

[3] *Infancy and Human Growth* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1928).

because they are organically inherited. Variations in them accompany maturation. Some traits ripen earlier than others. She recognizes, however, that temporary physiological conditions, viz., hunger, satiety, fatigue; and intelligent training, modify occasionally temperamental reactions. This maturational theory of Gesell and Downey is confirmed in the writings of N. Bayley,[1] Washburn, Bühler, Jersild, Valentine, Wheeler and Perkins.

The parallel development between physical and mental or social characteristics was presupposed by A. Binet[2] in the construction of intelligence tests though he limited the parallel relations to definite cultural situations. Users of intelligence tests have continued partly, despite R. Yerkes[3] contribution of a point scale, this presupposition in the standardization of behavior at successive ages.

Stockard thinks that the physical rate of growth and some glandular disturbances determine the nature of, and basic changes in, personal behavior.

Furfey makes the following tentative conclusions on the basis of test results. There is a definite relation between developmental age and puberty, and home conditions. There is some relation between developmental age and dental age, mental age, and socio-economic status. There is possibly some relation between developmental age and institutional life, and urban life. There is no relation between developmental age and physical measurements except puberty, carpal ossification, race, residence, delinquency, companionship, and position in family.

Freeman who reviewed the recent literature states that mental development is dependent partly upon organic changes. An early puberty is associated with an early maximum height, weight, mental growth, and high blood pressure. He gives also negative data which offset the importance of these relations.

In this viewpoint of parallel development, permanence and change of behavior are organically predetermined though the idea

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[1]"Study of the Crying of Infants During Mental and Physical Tests," JGP, XL (1932), 306 ff.

[2]"Nouvelles recherches sur la mesure du niveau intellectuel chez les enfants d'ecole," L'anne Psychologie, XVII (1911), 145 ff.

[3]Point Scale for Measuring Mental Ability (Baltimore: Warwick and York, 1915), pp. 43 f.

of maturation is not explicitly stated. Usually, the writers state emphatically that social behavior is dependent upon organic or physical development.

Interaction of heredity and environment.--G. Allport, F. Allport, Bowden, Morris and others account for the permanency of traits by the predominance of heredity and neural activity in the interaction of heredity and environment. G. Allport thinks that personality begins with the interaction of the original stream of activity and environment.[1] Although he says that every trait is a fusion of habits and native endowment (temperament, intelligence, and constitution),[2] he ascribes reclusiveness and retiring conduct in some individuals,[3] cyclothymia, melancholy, euphonia, phlegmatism,[4] and primary emotions (fear, anger, amusement, disgust)[5] to organic inheritance. Occasionally, he refers to constitutional inheritances (incipient talents and defects) that are manifested in suitable environments.[6] Sometimes, he speaks about intelligence and talents for art, music, and mathematics that are inborn and that undergo maturation.[7] For the most part, he accounts for the consistency and persistency of traits in terms of conditioning and compounding of simple reflexes,[8] generalization of habit,[9] and other associational processes that result in integration.[10] So far as he considers changes in personality traits, he explains them by crises[11] and individual insight.[12]

F. Allport thinks that the prepotent reflexes which are organically inherited are the principle mechanisms in the individual's adaptation to environment. The six classes of reflexes are starting and withdrawing, rejecting, struggling, hunger reactions, sensitive zone reactions, and sex reactions. Some ap-

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[1] Personality, p. 122; also "Personality Traits, etc.," p. 36.

[2] Personality, pp. 69, 104, 292.

[3] Ibid., pp. 16, 106. [4] Ibid., pp. 75, 129.

[5] Ibid., p. 71. [6] Ibid., p. 121. [7] Ibid., p. 148.

[8] Ibid., p. 137. [9] Ibid., p. 292.

[10] Ibid., p. 344. [11] Ibid., p. 211.

[12] Ibid., p. 221. On p. 101, Allport recognizes that the knowledge of heredity is meager, and that the problems of instinct, maturation, and learning though fairly well formulated are unsolved.

pear at birth and others appear later. All of them exert a controlling influence upon habit formation. Hence, habits are fundamentally dependent upon biological equipment rather than social environment. The latter releases the biological responses and provides a culture for their habitual expression. The basic habits or traits are permanent by declaration. Although Allport grants the changeability of non-basic traits by environmental conditioning, he is little concerned about them. It is unimportant whether a child runs from a test or struggles against it, because the fundamental trait is an unwillingness to face reality. This viewpoint of F. Allport is adopted by E. Morris and A. Bowden.[1]

Other writers, namely, Prince,[2] Hollingworth,[3] Freeman, explain the mutability of traits by the interaction of heredity and environment. They emphasize the predominance of environment. Heredity provides only the basis or pre-condition of trait development. For instance, Freeman assumes an innate basis for individual differences in the traits of will-temperament, emotional temperament, and moral disposition. Biological inheritances do not, however, determine the permanent nature of these traits. It is the environment which moulds and alters them. They are organizations of experience (e.g., habits, attitudes) rather than physiological or neurological behavior patterns.

According to J. Dorsey,[4] R. Park,[5] K. Young,[6] L. Bernard,[7] and L. Brown,[8] temperament has an organic and glandular basis but its permanence or mutability is caused by social experiences. Some instinctivists, e.g., Thorndike,[9] A. Shand,[10] Gates,[11]

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[1]"Study of the Personality of Student Leaders in Colleges in the United States," JAP, XXI (1926), 149-160.

[2]See pp. 65 ff. and 91 f.

[3]See pp. 73 ff. [4]Op cit., pp. 171 ff.

[5]R. Park and E. Burgess, op. cit., pp. 138 ff.

[6]Source Book for Social Psychology (New York: A. Knopf, 1927), pp. 177 ff.

[7]Op. cit., pp. 251 ff. [8]Op. cit., pp. 421 ff.

[9]Original Nature of Man (New York: Columbia University, 1913), pp. 41 ff.

[10]Foundations of Character (London: Macmillan Co., 1914), pp. 35 ff.

[11]Psychology for Students of Education (New York: Macmillan Co., 1923), pp. 135 ff.

Edman,[1] and Zachry[2] state occasionally that biological modes of behavior are greatly modified by institutions, customs, and habits. The inherited behavior provides only the basis for traits, habits, and attitudes which are mainly social products.

Social experiences of childhood.--For the most part, the explanations for the permanence of traits by Burgess[3] and Adler[4] were inevitably given in the presentation of their definitions. Complementary material only will be given here. Burgess postulates the four wishes of Thomas in the explanation of personality development. They are expressed in the personal behavior patterns though the involved process is not described. The personal behavior patterns are partly determined by original differences in mentality, temperament, and affectivity. These partial determinants are, however, modified by experience. The actual organization and fixation of the personal behavior patterns result from social interaction in early childhood. Concerning Adler's explanation, the style of life which is permanent determines the changes in compensatory behavior. They are superficial changes that are necessary in the accomplishment of an individual's life goal.

J. Watson does not adhere consistently to his explanation for the fixation of traits in the early experiences of childhood. He divides human actions into hereditary (emotional and instinctive) and acquired (habits) modes of responses.[5] In the former, some reflexes develop later than others though all of them are related to habit formation.[6] The conditioning of reflexes probably begins in the embryonic period.

He asserts that the emotional slants of childhood (especially, unverbalized behavior) persist and influence adult reactions. These early fixations result from emotional or sexual conditioning and respect for authority. In other passages, he says that habits can be unconditioned and conditioned at any age. The basic emotions of fear, rage, and love can be directed and their mode of expression can be altered by proper manipulation of the conditioned reflex mechanism.

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[1] Human Traits and Their Social Significance (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1920), pp. 2 ff.

[2] Op. cit., p. 61. [3] See pp. 97 ff. [4] See pp. 99 ff.

[5] Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist (Philadelphia, J. Lippincott, 1919).

[6] Behaviorism (New York: W. Norton and Co., 1930).

This stimulus-response scheme has been adapted by H. Garrett,[1] F. Howard and F. Patry, Burt, Valentine, Sayles, Jersild, M. Hamilton,[2] S. Smith and E. Guthrie,[3] and H. Cameron,[4] in the explanation of the permanence or mutability of traits.

Another explanation of the permanency of traits, due to early experiences, is given by psychoanalysts.[5] C. Jung deviates partly from the psychoanalytic interpretation though he explains the permanence of traits by organic inheritance.[6] (cf. especially his discussion of collective unconscious)[7] and early social experiences.

Early in life, a balance or equilibrium is created between an individual's conscious and unconscious behavior. When the conscious thinking attitude obstructs the libido, regression[8] to the unconscious feeling attitude occurs. Thereby, an adjustment is effected. This balance is also illustrated by the person who is consciously introverted and unconsciously extroverted.

The earliest marks of introversion are a reflective manner, extreme shyness, self-assertion, and mistrust. The initial characteristics of extroversion are a quick adaptation to environment, extraordinary attention to objects, and fearlessness. These major attitudes are variously combined with the fundamental functions of sensation, thinking, feeling, and intuition which are not uniformly developed in an individual.[9] Each function is

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[1]"Personality as 'Habit Organization,'" JAP, XXI (1926), 250-255.

[2]"Mental Hygiene and the Parasite: How Habits are Formed from Earliest Infancy through Pre-School Years," MH, V (1921), 38 ff.

[3]General Psychology (New York: D. Appleton Co., 1921), p. 186.

[4]Nervous Child (London: Oxford University, 1930), pp. 57 ff.

[5]See pp. 66 ff.

[6]Psychological Types (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1923), pp. 476 ff.

[7]Contributions to Analytical Psychology (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1928), pp. 110 ff.

[8]Illustrations of a different use of regression are given by Leta Hollingworth, see M. Bentley and E. Cowdry (eds.), Problem of Mental Disorder (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1934), p. 363.

[9]A. Roback (ed.), Problems of Personality (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1925), p. 302.

subdivided. For example, thinking is divided into speculative, logical, and empirical activities.

Concerning the treatment of neurosis, Jung writes

> Take away the obstacle in the path of life and this whole system of infantile phantasies at once breaks down and becomes again as inactive and ineffective as before. But do not let us forget that, to a certain extent, it is at work influencing us always and everywhere.[1]

Notwithstanding these foregoing commitments to the permanency of traits, Jung approves of the mutability of traits in some passages. For instance, he says that pronounced modifications can occur when a person moves from one milieu to another.[2] Environments require sometimes different attitudes. Since social character is determined primarily by group expectations and individual aims, trait changes can be expected in an individual's movement from one environment to another. It is doubtful whether these changes are basic because he remarks immediately after the preceding reference that the reality attitude is extremely permanent though its effective accomplishment is always impermanent.

Contrary to the viewpoint of psychoanalysts and such persons as Jung, some writers regard individual motives as mutable. J. Feutinger[3] changed the motives of ex-service men in effecting their economic adjustments. William Book[4] modified students' attitudes by creating new motives. In this manner, the new traits of industry, carefulness, and scholarship were developed. M. Hamilton[5] eliminates social maladjustments of individuals by the analysis and alteration of motives.[6]

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[1] Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology (New York: Moffat Yard and Co., 1917), p. 232.

[2] A. Roback (ed.), Problems of Personality, p. 302.

[3] "Mental Factor in the Economic Adjustment of 500 Disabled Ex-Service Men," MH, X (1926), 686 ff.

[4] "How to Develop an Interest in One's Tasks and Work," JEP, XVIII (1927), 1 ff.

[5] "Psychological Analysis and Re-Education with Case Studies," JAP, XIII (1919).

[6] For further remarks on the mutability of motives see pp. 70 ff.

Self, and group expectations.--R. Park,[1] A. Todd,[2] and L. Brown[3] say that the self is the core of personality. Gilliland,[4] H. Bloch,[5] C. Arrowood,[6] E. Fairs,[7] and G. Mead[8] identify the self with the personality. Changes in either one involve modifications in the other.

The relation between the self and the constancy or inconstancy of personality was critically presented by Mead. His analysis was based upon the following assumptions: (1) unity of behavior or experience; (2) relativity and emergence in evolution; (3) rudimentary social process;[9] (4) primacy of societal activity;[10] and (5) activity of the organism. In the development of the self, the important physiological conditions were: (1) vocal-auditory apparatus for self-stimulation; (2) opposable thumb for manipulation of objects; (3) merging of touch and sight;[11] and (4) physiological similarity of human beings except for differences of sex and maturity.

The physiological organism, especially the central nervous system, is socialized. An individual's physical movements acquire meaning in the interaction with other persons. This is

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[1]"Urban Community as a Spacial Pattern and a Moral Order," Urban Community, p. 17.

[2]Theories of Social Progress (New York: Macmillan Co., 1924), p. 6.

[3]Op. cit., p. 133.

[4]Op. cit., p. 317.

[5]Concept of Our Changing Loyalties (New York: Columbia University Press, 1934), p. 88.

[6]"The Place of Reflective Thinking in the Development and Maintenance of Moral Values," Abstracts of Theses, Humanistic Series, III (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924), p. 6.

[7]"Standpoint and Methods of Sociology in the Study of Personality and Social Growth," p. 5.

[8]Mind, Self, and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), Pt. iii.

[9]"What Social Objects Must Psychology Presuppose?" JP, VII (1910), 177.

[10]"Social Psychology as Counterpart to Physiological Psychology," PB, VI (1909), 405 ff.

[11]"Mechanism of Social Consciousness," JPPSM, IX (1912), 404 f.

illustrated by the significant gesture[1] which refers to a common response to an object.[2] The significant gesture is the meeting place of persons, the entrance to concerted activity, the key to meaning, the locus of mind, the origin of self, the domain of universals, and the partial explanation of permanence and change.

According to Mead,

> The self arises in conduct, when the individual becomes a social object in experience to himself. This takes place when the individual assumes the attitude or uses the gesture which another individual would use and responds to it himself, or tends so to respond. It arises in the life of the infant through what is unfortunately called imitation, and finds its expression in the normal play life of young children. In the process the child gradually becomes a social being in his own experience, and he acts toward himself in a manner analogous to that in which he acts toward others. Especially he talks to himself as he talks to others and in keeping up this conversation in the inner forum constitutes the field which is called that of mind. Then those objects and experiences which belong to his own body, those images which belong to his own past, become part of this self.[3]

In another article, he defines the self as "this combination of the remembered self which acts and exists over against other selves with the inner response to his action which is essential to the self-conscious ego."[4]

In early childhood, the self and personality are not fully developed.[5] The child takes only the roles of particular persons. Later, when he takes by the abstract process of thought the role of the generalized other, he manifests a definite personality or self.

The self disintegrates temporarily when it is confronted with a problem, and a new self develops, It is not entirely new because it is accepted into consciousness by the old self. The process is essentially reconstruction rather than displacement. In a problematic situation, the I and Me of self are noticeable

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[1]"Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol," JP, XIX (1922), 157 ff.

[2]"Social Consciousness and the Consciousness of Meaning," PB, VII (1910), 400 f.

[3]"Behavioristic Account, etc.," p. 161.

[4]"Social Self," JPPSM, X (1913), 378.

[5]Mind, Self, Society, Pt. iii.

because they represent the functioning of the personal mind that is an importation of the social mind. The I is the actor or the incalculable aspect of self (a source of personality changes). The me is the generalized other. In the conversation of the I and Me, a person lives in a private social world where he is seemingly independent of group approval or disapproval. Nevertheless, the organization of the self, as well as its permanency or mutability are dependent upon the organized social process and expectations of the group.[1]

John Dewey[2] assumes that mind and body are functions or qualities of action[3] and that action of the individual organism[4] is primary datum. The latter is evident in the infant's impulsive activities. The individual's on-going activity[5] is directed and his personal experiences are determined by customs and institutions. Thus, his impulses are organized into habits whose interpenetration constitutes character or personality.

Personality changes are initiated by impulses that frustrate habits, and by conflicting patterns of conduct that disorganize the self. The disruption of habits creates imaginative activity which includes emotion, reason, and deliberation. In this imaginative activity that is "a dramatic rehearsal of various competing possible lines of action," new objects are invented and new habits are established. The self is re-created because there is "no one ready-made self behind activities."

Absolute permanence of personality is less apparent than continuity of conduct. The relative persistence of conduct is

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[1]F. Herbart anticipated part of this relation between the individual and the group. He said that "If the whole environment is opposed to it [an idea] in its thought, or mainly moving in a different direction, then a definite idea can, at the best, only generate an isolated activity, it will soon be extinguished by the weight of what is foreign to it." (J. Merz, History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century, IV [London: W. Blackwood and Sons, 1903-14], p. 578.) A similar anticipation was made by J. S. Mill in A System of Logic, 8th edition (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1874), p. 597.

[2]For complementary materials see pp. 104 f.

[3]"Body and Mind," in mimeographed material of E. Helleberg.

[4]"Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," PR, III (1896), 357.

[5]Experience and Nature (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1925), pp. 26 ff.

due to an individual's participation in, and identification with, the collective practises of non-conflicting groups.

In several passages, Dewey is not entirely consistent with this preceding explanation of change and permanence. For instance, he says that

> Very early in life, sets of mind are formed without attentive thought, and these sets persist and control the mature mind. The child learns to avoid the shock of unpleasant disagreement, to find the easy way out, to appear to conform to customs which are wholly mysterious to him in order to get his own way--that is to display some natural impulse without exciting the unfavorable notice of those in authority. Adults distrust the intelligence which a child has while making upon him demands for a kind of conduct that requires a high order of intelligence, if it is to be intelligent at all. The inconsistency is reconciled by instilling in him 'moral' habits which have a maximum of emotional empressment and adamantine hold with a minimum of understanding. These habitudes, deeply engrained before thought is awake and even before the day of experiences which can later be recalled, govern conscious later thought.[1]
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> Impulse . . . . brings with itself the possibility but not the assurance of a steady re-organization of habits to meet new elements in new situations.[2]

Ellsworth Faris[3] explains changes[4] in the self by conscious copying of things which satisfy wishes, aims, and ambitions, and by a slow, unwitting copying that involves the re-enactment of vivid experiences. Both procedures result usually in personality changes. The relation of group expectations to the mutability and constancy of self is succinctly stated in the following quotation.

> What we call the stable elements of human nature are in truth the social attitudes of individual persons, which in turn are the subjective aspects of long-established group attitudes whose inertia must be reckoned with but whose mutability cannot be denied . . . . The history of social movements is but a record of changing human nature . . . . . Such movements, when they generate leaders and develop institutions passing on to legal and political changes, create profound alterations of the mores and thoroughly transform not only the habits of a people and their nature as they live together but also the basic conception of what constitutes human nature.[5]

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[1] Human Nature and Conduct, p. 98.

[2] Ibid., p. 104. See also, Experience and Nature, pp. 300 f.

[3] For complementary materials see pp. 106 f.

[4] "Concept of Imitation," AJS, XXXII (1926), 372 ff.

[5] Nature of Human Nature (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1937), p. 18.

W. Swift[1] and G. Meyers[2] demonstrate experimentally the unwitting copying of new behavior. Gilliland,[3] A. Brown,[4] and E. Bogardus[5] elaborate the conscious copying of behavior. In another article, Bogardus[6] explains changes in personal behavior by new group expectations.

Louis Wirth says that personality traits are acquired through an individual's incorporation into a culture or intangible moral order where the individual acquires status, habits, attitudes, and a conception of himself.

> Our personal traits . . . . are . . . . the product of our experiences, and in these the earliest experiences, acquired in the course of intimate, informal association, occupy a pre-eminent position. The significance from our standpoint of childhood and early experiences in the family, in the play group and in other intimate and informal associations is the disposition to acquire the sense that the values and the forms which this social world imposes upon the developing personality are natural, and that with reference to these as a norm other subsequently encountered cultural forms are to be judged.[7]

The reciprocal relation between the group expectations and traits of an individual's early years does not always persist because the individual participates usually as he matures in widely different cultural groups.

> Under these circumstances the consistency and the discipline that our personality acquires in the personal relationships of primary groups may be subjected to tension and to strain . . . . . Individuals cannot long retain integrity of character except in a group which provides them with those full, intimate, personal relations in which personality first develops.[8]

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[1]"Mental Attitudes in Debate," Journal of Applied Psychology, III (1919), 161 ff.

[2]"Control of Conduct by Suggestion," Journal of Applied Psychology, V (1921), 26 ff.

[3]Genetic Psychology, p. 329.

[4]Energizing Personality (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1929), pp. 7 f.

[5]"Leadership and Social Situation," SSR, XVI (1931), 164 ff.

[6]"Social Distance, A Measuring Stick," Survey, LVI (1926), 208.

[7]"Some Characteristics of the Sociological Approach to Personality," pp. 10 f.

[8]Ibid., p. 8.

M. Van Waters effects reformation of delinquent behavior by "insight, transference, development of personality, (growth of skill, clear ideas of new behavior-goals, and the wish for social esteem), development of new social relationships."[1]

M. Richmond,[2] C. Zachry,[3] R. Barker,[4] and M. Sayles[5] also change personal conduct by the development of insight in the individual, and by the creation of new environments for the individual.

Physical conditions.--A few writers attribute some trait changes to physical circumstances. Wile[6] describes an encephalitic girl who talked constantly, wandered aimlessly about the school room, and thought uncertainly. Curti[7] mentions a variety of physical conditions which influence traits. For instance, physical health and vitality affect cheerfulness, impulsiveness, optimism, and moodiness. Physical defects create inferiority. Excessive thyroid secretion[8] stimulates emotionality. Puberal growth modifies existing traits. H. Welles[9] records the following trait changes in deaf persons: change in appearance and voice; inability to understand; inattention; irresponsibility; lack of sympathy; curiosity; tactlessness; depressive tendencies (sense of inferiority, sensitiveness, fear, self-centeredness); and paranoid tendencies (brooding, suspicion, persecutory feelings, rage). B. Bryngelson[10] gives a general description of personality changes that result from the correction of speech defects. Kretsch-

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[1] Youth in Conflict (New York: Republic Publishing Co., 1925), pp. 178 ff.

[2] What is Social Case Work? (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1922), pp. 21-25.

[3] Op. cit., p. 44.

[4] "Effect of an Unsatisfactory Relationship of Brother to Brother on the Development of Personality," SF, IX (1930), 90.

[5] Problem Child at Home; Problem Child in School.

[6] Op. cit., p. 70. [7] Op. cit., pp. 480 ff.

[8] For the viewpoints of Endocrinologists, see pp. 214 f.

[9] Measurement of Certain Aspects of Personality Among Hard of Hearing Adults (New York: Columbia University, 1932), p. 79.

[10] "Personality Changes," QJS, XIV (1928), 207 ff.

mer explains a few cases of temperamental changes by brain trauma. A. Thom[1] cites cases of behavior changes which follow a sickness. He thinks that each child lived in a changed environment during the sickness, and that the child attempted to perpetuate that environment after recuperation.

The evaluation of the foregoing answers to the problem of the mutability of traits will be introduced by an analysis of the problem. A basic question is--how can the existence of the problem be explained? One answer is that experience has created it though little is known about its origin. Change is perceived because habitual activity is frustrated. If this is true, the adherents to the mutability of traits have a problem which can be studied scientifically. Change creates exceptions to previous generalizations, and the problem is the control of these exceptions through research. The adherents to the permanence of traits cannot have a scientific problem because there are no exceptions. They can test only the theories of those whom they challenge.

Another basic question is--what is meant by the mutability of personality traits? In an extreme sense, it means that traits are not the same in time or space. Dewey,[2] Follett,[3] Faris,[4] Koffka,[5] Bloch,[6] and Leta Hollingworth[7] say that no two situations are identical. The organism is always changing, and every response is to a new situation. In other statements, some of these authors speak less emphatically about the variability of human conduct. They recognize that social order and individual organization are sustained by significant symbols or responses. Persons react to one another in terms of expected behavior. Since disappointments occur in the expectant behavior, it is probable that these writers

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[1] Habit Clinics for the Child of Preschool Age (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1924), pp. 50-52.

[2] Human Nature and Conduct, chap. vii.

[3] Creative Experience.

[4] "Nature of Human Nature," p. 34.

[5] Dummer (ed.), Unconscious--A Symposium, pp. 49 f.

[6] Op. cit., p. 168.

[7] Bentley and Cowdry (eds.), Problem of Mental Disorder, p. 361.

imply the continuity rather than the permanency of conduct in the phrase "expected behavior." Continuity is engendered, as well as transformed through the mutual activity of members of a group. Change cannot be perceived without the assumption of, at least, a continuity of conduct. If I say that my conduct has changed, I imply that I am partly the same because I must be on successive occasions in order to judge the differences in my conduct. This does not mean necessarily that I, an adult, can recognize my childhood self. It is conceivable that in the continuity of conduct there can be relatively complete changes in the reference of I.

Dewey, Faris, Wirth, and others recognize that the exact process of continuity is not completely known, and that the acceptance of continuity is an acknowledgment of the persistence as well as change of personality traits.

The other aspect of this second basic question is--what is meant by the permanence of personality traits? In an extreme sense, it means that traits are always the same. Burgess, G. Allport, Adler, and others assert the permanence of personality traits, but they admit that the traits operate in phases of an individual's conduct that are mutable, e.g., social types (Burgess), character traits (Adler), sentiments (MacDougall), and scalable traits (Allport). Some adherents (F. Allport, Shirley, Glueck, Bühler, Woods) to permanency concede environmental changes that retard, re-inforce, or over-develop personality traits. Other adherents (G. Allport, H. Witmer, Howard, Patry) acknowledge trait variations but add that the changes are not significant. It is important, however , that the proponents of permanency cannot avoid the recognition of some changes in the individual's conduct.

The implicit, if not actual, recognition of permanence and change of personality traits by most writers suggests that the inherent difficulties of any answer cannot be avoided by denying them. The answer to the present problem does not consist in the denial of change or the refutation of permanency, but rather consists in an understanding of the circumstances that create each and the relations that exist between them.

Attention will now be directed from the analysis of this problem to the conception and use of environment in the various

answers. The writers[1] who explain trait changes by environment think that changes result from the effective rather than the general environment. It is the environment where self and selves originate, exist, and change. In other words, personality and the effective environment are created simultaneously. In this viewpoint, neither the individual nor the group environment can effect trait changes though some of these writers have frequently explained trait changes by environmental changes. They overlook their previous emphasis upon social interaction or mutual activity between the individual and his groups. Undoubtedly, these writers have established the fact of change but have not explained adequately the cause of change.

These writers have contributed to the knowledge about the criterion of trait change in their emphasis upon the new reactions of a person. For instance, Curti[2] identifies trait changes as the new behavior in habitual delinquents who are removed from old social situations to new environments. When these delinquents return to the old situations, the old traits re-appear frequently in many of them. Healy[3] placed a girl who had a mental conflict in a new home for several weeks, and her behavior changed decidedly. When she returned to her old home, much of the old behavior re-occurred. Richmond[4] suggests that the real test of trait changes is the persistence in an old environment of acquired behavior in a new environment. She adds that an old environment can be re-defined to an individual with the result that his responses are changed without removing him to a new residence.

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[1]In addition to those who have been previously mentioned, there are the following. C. Ellwood, "Modifiability of Human Nature and Human Institutions," JAS, VII (1923), 229. R. Cavan, Suicide (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928), p. 12. R. Edwards and E. Hilgard, Student Counseling (Ithaca: National Council on Religion in Higher Education, 1928), p. 23. E. Bogardus, Fundamentals of Social Psychology (New York: Century Co., 1931), pp. 97 ff. M. Viteles, Industrial Psychology (New York: W. Norton and Co., 1932), pp. 245 f. T. J. McCormack, "Critique of Mental Measurements," SS, XV (1922), 691. L. Abbott, "Popular Fallacies --That We Cannot Change Human Nature," Outlook, CXXIII (1919), 46.

[2]Op. cit., p. 446.

[3]Mental Conflict and Misconduct (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1917), pp. 174-180.

[4]What is Social Case Work? pp. 115 ff.

The foregoing writers use not only the new responses as criteria of trait changes, but also, relate the responses to new environments. The criterion of a new environment is not defined though these writers recognize that an individual must perceive the environment as new. Usually, if an individual reacts differently, the existence of a new environment is assumed. In this procedure, it is apropos to reiterate a previous remark, namely, that trait changes are located in the social interaction between the individual and environments but the exact cause of change is not explained.

Writers of this same group explain the persistence of traits by a constant environment[1] though they do not explain the existence of a constant environment. For the most part, this explanation is a deduction that is based upon trait changes in new environments. It is also partly based upon studies of complexes and fixations that are traced to an earlier environment, as well as, studies of individual identification with, and response to, ideals of a remote environment.

Some writers who adhere to the mutability of traits conceive of environment in terms of external things. Old and new environments are determined respectively by the sameness and unlikeness of material objects. For instance, E. Jones,[2] R. White,[3] O. Hall,[4] Moede,[5] and others engage in experiments that require

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[1]For specific statements see any of the following. Shaw, Natural History of a Delinquent Career, p. 180. W. Olson and M. Wilkinson, "Measurement of Child Behavior in Terms of Its Social Stimulus Value," JEE, I (1923), 93. H. Cantril, "Psychological Reason for the Lag of 'Non-Material' Culture Traits," SF, XIII (1935), 378. R. Flannery, "Gossip as a Clue to Attitudes," Primitive Man, VII (1934), 8. J. Patrick, Role of Intimate Groups in the Personality Development of Selected College Men (Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1935), p. 35. T. Eliot, "Use of Psychoanalytic Classification in the Analysis of Social Behavior: Identification," PASS, XXI (1927), 185. R. Park, "Personality and Cultural Conflict," PASS, XXV (1931), 108. Goodenough, Developmental Psychology, p. 444. Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 58.

[2]"Opinions of College Students," p. 431.

[3]"Effect of Emotional Disturbance on Ability to Concentrate," SS, XXII (1925), 343 f.

[4]"Attitudes and Unemployment--Comparison of the Opinions and Attitudes of Employed and Unemployed Men," AP, (March, 1934), No. 165.

[5]Op. cit.

the manipulation of external stimuli. This conception of environment excludes the individual's perceptions. From the individual's standpoint, new external stimuli might represent either a new or an old environment. Consequently, such experiments are not conclusive demonstrations of the relation between traits and environments.

Among those who adhere to the absolute permanence of some or all traits, there are two major conceptions of environment. The first viewpoint is usually held by writers[1] who explain permanency by organic heredity or maturation. According to them, environment is represented by anything that is learned, or that is external to native equipment. Similar and dissimilar environments are identified respectively by the sameness and unlikeness of the external settings (see Galton,[2] Jersild,[3] Thorndike,[4] Paterson,[5] Stern,[6] or Shirley[7]). Paterson and Shirley touch upon the qualitative aspects of training but do not recognise the significance of meanings in social interaction.

In this first conception, heredity and environment are entities or substances that are opposed to each other. The fact is overlooked that organic inheritance is not dissociable from environment.[8] Consequently, the permanency of a trait can never be due solely to heredity. This fact is partially granted by writers (F. Allport, Thorndike, Gesell) who say that an individual cannot develop traits without environmental influences. Nevertheless, they persist in the separation of heredity from environment though they have been unsuccessful in the isolation of heredity or environment in experimental research.

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[1]They discount the extreme plasticity of the inherited biological structure.

[2]Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development (New York: Macmillan Co., 1883), pp. 218-241.

[3]Op. cit., p. 402.

[4]Educational Psychology(New York: Lemcke and Buechner, 1903), pp. 41-44.

[5]Physique and Intellect, pp. 288 f.

[6]Psychology of Early Childhood (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1924), pp. 60 f.

[7]Op. cit., pp. 206 f.

[8]See for this criticism, H. S. Jennings, Biological Basis of Human Nature (New York: W. Norton & Co., 1930), chaps. vi f.

The constancy of behavior in dissimilar environments (externally different) is not proof of hereditary influences because the effective environment might be unchanged.

The second major conception among those who adhere to the absolute permanence of traits is represented by the writers who explain the permanency in terms of early social experiences. Environment refers to social interaction, experiences, and stimuli. By implication, the early environment modifies all behavior and makes permanent the personality traits. The later environment modifies only a part of behavior and does not make anything permanent. Most of these writers explain usually the fixation of traits in one of the following ways. First, the repetition of activities (especially satisfying ones) during the plastic and impressionistic years leaves residuals which dominate or eliminate new actions.[1] Second, neurological activities are conditioned and persist as motor propulsions in later experiences.[2] Third, the flexibility of the infant decreases with age, and consequently, the early acquired traits persist.[3] This process is comparable to the decreased modifiability of the maturing embryo. Fourth, behavior patterns are the resultants of early social interaction.[4]

It is questionable whether environment can create something which it cannot modify. Psychiatrists have described insane persons who have multiple personalities, or logic tight compartments that do not always change under environmental pressure. It is, however, the fixity of response in the insane person that differentiates him from the normal person. The latter is responsive to group expectations. He is adaptable because he is an integral part of collective environmental activities.

These writers concede the changeability of some behavior after the early years. It occurs presumably through the recipro-

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[1]Gilliland, Genetic Psychology, p. 321. Blatz and Bott, op. cit., pp. 210 f. Patrick, op. cit., pp. 38 f. R. McDougall, "Habit and the Social Order," SS, III (1916), 727. Howard and Patry, op. cit., pp. 200 f.

[2]Perrin and Klein, op. cit., p. 14. F. Allport, op. cit. Watson, op. cit., pp. 288 ff. C. Campbell, "Experiences of the Child: How They Affect Character and Behavior," MH, IV (1920), 312 ff.

[3]Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, pp. 298 ff.

[4]See Burgess and Adler pp. 97 ff.

cal activity between such behavior and environment. On the other hand, personality traits are unalterable after the early years. Apparently, mechanical adjustment only exists between personality traits and all environment after the first years of childhood. It is doubtful, however, whether any social activity can be reduced to a mechanical basis. Automatic habits are mechanical in a sense but are susceptible of change. It is possible that these writers have not discerned the permanence of an environment in the permanent personality traits. It is hardly conceivable that the later environments do not perpetuate the permanent traits that are supposedly independent of them. Finally, it is not clearly perceivable that the explanations of fixation account invariably for an early permanence of traits. It is almost unbelievable that environment loses its formative function after the early years of an individual's life. Repetition of activities can be indefinitely frustrated. Conditioned and re-conditioned neurological activities are not unknown in later life. Biological plasticity is usually present until the age of adulthood. Social interaction does not cease at any time. Consequently, the apparent permanency of traits should not be mistaken for their inevitable permanence.

Among the writers who subscribe to the permanence of traits, some refer to environment in terms of the laboratory experiment. Their conception of environment is similar to that of some writers who endorse the mutability of traits. Both assume that the laboratory environment is a simple reproduction of certain everyday social situations. It is doubtful whether complex life situations can be re-created in a simple situation. In all probability, the laboratory situation is another complex relation or situation.

This evaluation of the problem of mutability will be concluded with special comments upon the viewpoints of a few writers. No writer will be selected from the group that explains the permanence of traits by organic inheritances. This explanation has been sufficiently reviewed in the foregoing remarks. Also, no writer will be selected from the group that explains some trait changes by physical conditions. For the most part, this explanation is unformulated theoretically and is a minor emphasis among writers. Some writers are selected from each of the other group explanations on the permanence or mutability of personality traits.

Most criticisms of the instinct theory of traits apply to the formulation by Woodworth rather than by McDougall because the latter locates the instinctive drives in the mind instead of in physical behavior. Nevertheless, opponents have criticized McDougall on the following grounds. First, original nature does not exist apart from culture, and consequently, the hereditary instinctive behavior cannot be accurately ascertained. Second, universal behavior can be explained by universal habits and customs. Moreover, contradictory behavior patterns in the same and different cultures can be accounted by differential habits and customs but they cannot be explained by universal instincts. Third, studies of genetic inheritance have not disclosed the inherited behavior that is denoted by instincts.

Another maturational theory is by Gesell. There are three principle criticisms of his formulation of maturation. First, he has not studied individuals from birth to adulthood, and therefore, he has not proven that childhood traits are unmodifiable except within the maturational process. Second, he has not isolated maturational behavior from environmental influences. This is a pre-requisite to the determination of the importance of maturation as he defines it. Third, he has not distinguished between effective and general environments. It is not true that fraternal twins who have the same home, mother, and the like, have necessarily similar environments. A mother may react differently to each of her children, and her home may not mean identical things to each child. Consequently, Gesell has not demonstrated the ineffectuality of environment. Where he should have noticed similarities in the general environments, he has overlooked them. For example, a twin is given special training in stair climbing. After a period of practise, the twins are tested on stair climbing. The untrained twin does as well as the trained twin. This proves, according to Gesell, the ineffectiveness of environment. He overlooks, however, the resemblances between the special training and the general activities of the untrained twin, e.g., walking, crawling, and jumping.

G. Allport is a representative of the group that explains the permanence of traits by the interaction of heredity and environment. He asserts that traits are persistent though a person manifests on different occasions extroversion and introversion. The real personality traits are the permanent relations between

traits. There are two weaknesses in this statement. First, all activities are relations, and it is an arbitrary procedure to designate some temporary and others permanent. Second, the relation between two activities (traits) is not a third activity, but is a part of them. Consequently, the relation changes when the activities or traits change.[1]

F. Allport, another representative of this group, does not explain the origin of the prepotent reflexes, and does not account for the control of later habits by the prepotent reflexes. The regard for the rights of others and social duties, as he describes them, are not noticeably dependent upon prepotent habit systems. In several passages, he contradicts himself on the permanency of traits. For instance, he remarks about the soundness of judgment (an aspect of intelligence) which age and experience "surely contribute to the original capacity for adaptation." In the discussion of sociality, he states definitely that the original egoistic prepotent reflexes are modified by the social environment.

The fixation of personality traits in early childhood experiences is confirmed by Burgess. Of what significance is his definition of the family as a group of interacting personalities[2] if personality traits are immutable after the age of six? Apparently, behavior changes in the older family members refer to social types. In view of this fact, the question is appropriate--what is an individual apart from his social types (attitudes, values, sentiments, etc.)? In one article,[3] Burgess compares the characteristics of child and adult. The former possesses naivete, freshness, sincerity, objectivity, random multiform activity, projects, etc. The latter has conventionality, a master project, and personal autonomy. Certainly, all these attributes of child and adult are attitudes, values, sentiments, or social type

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[1]These criticisms are more directly applicable to his articles than his book. In the latter, he subscribes to permanency and mutability; and his true position is difficult to ascertain especially in such a statement as personality persists though it changes.

[2]"Family as a Unity of Interacting Personalities," Family, VII (1926), 3 ff.

[3]E. Burgess and Others, "Who is Grown Up?" Survey, LX (1928), 17.

characteristics. Moreover the so-called personality traits, e.g., resentment, suspicion, and injustice, resemble strikingly attitudes, values, sentiments or social type characteristics. Apparently, an individual has no human nature apart from his social types. Perhaps there is no fundamental distinction between personality and social type. The concepts are used interchangeably by the following writers who accept the mutability of personality traits; E. Ross,[1] E. Hughes,[2] A. Todd,[3] A. Bawden,[4] C. Morgan,[5] H. Zorbaugh,[6] L. Wirth,[7] N. Hayner,[8] and E. Bogardus.[9]

Burgess states that Stanley's personality traits are permanent, but the boy's life history discloses some trait changes. For instance, he expresses no injustice (his basic personality trait) at the time of his marriage. In his dealings with Clifford Shaw, he displays no feelings of injustice. In fact, Stanley writes in some passages that he feels that he has been unjust to others.

A different interpretation of the fixation of traits in early childhood is given by John Watson. He accounts for a variety of behavior through the conditioned reflex mechanism. For instance, a baby is passive but possesses many reflexes.[10] Stimuli bombard the baby and different stimuli bring forth different responses, e.g., fear, rage, and love (X, Y, Z). To this extent, there is a variety of behavior. New behavior cannot be further

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[1] Social Control (New York: Macmillan Co., 1901), pp. 220 ff.

[2] "Personality Types and the Division of Labor," AJS, XXXIII (1928), 761.

[3] Theories of Social Progress, p. 14.

[4] "Study of the Personality of Student Leaders in Colleges in the United States," JAP, XXI (1926), 761.

[5] "Individual and Person," AJS, XXXIV (1929), 626 ff.

[6] "Dweller in Furnished Rooms," Urban Community, pp. 98 ff.

[7] "Some Jewish Types of Personality," Ibid., pp. 106 ff.

[8] "Hotel Life and Personality," AJS, XXXIII (1928), 784 ff.

[9] "Personality and Occupational Attitudes," SSR, XII (1927), 73.

[10] Some Physiologists have shown that integrated patterns exist prior to reflexes.

explained by the conditioned reflex principle because conditioning develops only habit systems and integrations of activities. Watson surmounts the difficulty by the explanation of new responses in terms of the conditioned stimulus principle. It is very doubtful whether he demonstrates successfully the application of the principle of the conditioned stimulus to the conditioned response.

The stimulus-response scheme that he uses in the explanation of early childhood behavior is supplanted by the response-stimulus scheme in the explanation of an individual's behavior after habits have been established. He says that an individual cannot be prevented from taking his old internal environment (words and word substitutes) into a new environment. Apparently, in later childhood and adult behavior, habitual responses determine the effective stimuli. Watson says nothing, however, about the determinants that select stimuli before habits are formed, i.e., in early childhood.

A representative of the group that explains trait changes in terms of the self and group expectations is George Herbert Mead. There are several deficiencies in his discussion of the self. First, there is no adequate demonstration of the socialization of the I. Since the I is a response to the me, the latter exists prior to the former. On the other hand, since the I is impulsive activity, it could exist earlier than the me because the organism is always active. The behaviorist, of course, questions the primacy of activity. Mead could not explain, however, the socialization of the I on the supposition that the organism is always active. He presupposes, in addition, a rudimentary social process. Consequently, his explanation does not pertain to the incipient process of socialization, but rather to its continuation. There is practically no materials in Mead's writings on the directive nature of the infant's earliest responses.

A second deficiency is that the concept of role taking explains only rational or purposive behavior. Since most activity involves automatic or emotional behavior, the concept does not adequately account for much conduct. Moreover, the process of social interaction involves more than taking the other's role. Person A re-enacts part of his own role by taking the other's role, B, because B has taken A's role in responding to A. This complexity of social interaction almost prevents the designation of an initial starting point in social interaction, and an itemization

of parts, places, etc., in the process.

A final deficiency is that the individual's organization of particular roles into the role of the generalized other is not explicitly stated. Nowhere does Mead explain the individual's selection or rejection of generalized others. Nevertheless, the concept of the generalized other serves adequately in the explanation of concerted activity, e.g., baseball playing where an individual player responds to the expectancy of the generalized other, i.e., the other base ball players.

The concept is a definite advancement upon the explanation of control of the individual in terms of particular persons or roles. Sometimes, the identification of the generalized other that is the recipient of an individual's response can be difficult. This is especially true in the individuals who respond to many generalized others.

The presentation of this problem of mutability began with the recognition that it is usually not differentiated from the problem of specificity or generality. These problems are not always identical, and this fact should be evident after consideration of the following data.

Specificity

The presentation of materials will be confined to answers to the question: What are the attitudes of writers to the specificity or generality of traits? The majority of writers do not give separate explanations for the causes of mutability or permanence and specificity or generality of traits. The answers are classified and will be given as follows: (1) generality of traits; (2) generality of some traits; (3) specificity of traits; (4) specificity or generality of traits; and (5) tendency toward generality of traits.

Generality of traits.--The writers in this group will be sub-divided into (1) those who believe that there is only one basic trait that pervades an individual's behavior; (2) those who mention multiple general traits in an individual; and (3) those who refer to the generality of traits that they have specially investigated.

Burgess[1] thinks that every individual manifests a basic

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[1] Jack-Roller, pp. 190 f.

trait that dominates all other traits. In Stanley's life, it is a sense of injustice that pervades all other traits. Shaw[1] who has collaborated with Burgess corroborates this theory. Adler[2] refers to a style of life that is early acquired and that influences all later behavior. Piaget[3] writes lengthily about the prevalence of egocentrism in the child's behavior. Psychoanalysts[4] interpret all behavior in terms of the libido desire which is expressed homosexually in girl babies and incestuously in boy babies. Josiah Royce[5] reduces all conduct to manifestations of loyalty which he defines as "The willing and practical and thorough-going devotion of a person to a cause."

Among the foregoing writers, Burgess and Adler do not specify any one trait as the basic trait in all individuals. Piaget, Freud, and Royce do designate a particular trait as the basic, general trait. The following writers, Wickman,[6] Bühler,[7] Kretschmer,[8] Blatz and Bott,[9] Lundholm,[10] and E. Spranger,[11] limit the variety of basic traits though an individual displays only one of them. Wickman says that a child's basic reaction is either withdrawal or attack. Bühler mentions the alternatives of activity or passivity after the child reaches the age of six months. Kretschmer describes the cyclothymic and schizothymic temperaments and their respective sub-types. Blatz and Bott analyze the basic motor attitudes into approach and withdrawal. Lundholm identifies an individual as altrocentric or egocentric. Spranger thinks that an individual is dominated by one of six life-patterns, namely, theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social, political, or religious.

The enumeration of writers who indicate two or more gen-

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[1] Ibid., p. 47. [2] Understanding Human Nature, pp. 5 f.

[3] Child's Conception of Physical Causality, pp. 301 ff.

[4] See pp. 66 ff.

[5] Philosophy of Loyalty (New York: Macmillan Co., 1924), pp. 129 ff.

[6] Op. cit., pp. 136 ff. [7] First Year of Life, pp. 16 ff.

[8] Psychology of Men of Genius, pp. 52 ff.

[9] Op. cit., pp. 79 ff. [10] Op. cit.

[11] Types of Men (Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1928), pp. 37 f.

eral traits in an individual will begin with G. Allport.[1] For him, traits are generalized modes of adjustment. He thinks that the foci of personality though not entirely separate from one another exist in a few distinguishable central traits.[2] Occasionally, an individual may be so completely integrated that he is dominated by one cardinal trait.[3] F. Allport[4] names the fundamental traits of intelligence, motility, temperament, self-expression, and sociality. Bowden[5] and Morris[6] who follow F. Allport adopt similar general traits. Garrett[7] divides the fundamental habit systems into work, personal or bodily, play, moral, emotional, and social. According to J. Downey,[8] temperament is composed of the general traits of speed and fluidity of reaction, forcefulness and decisiveness of reaction, and carefulness and persistence of reaction. Gesell[9] makes no formal list of general patterns though he gives in various passages the general traits of placidity, social responsiveness, complacency, tempo, temperament, alertness, emotionality, and precocity. Watson[10] discovered the fundamental emotional reactions of X, Y, and Z (fear, rage, and love). W. Cannon[11] describes fear, rage, pain, anger, joy, grief, and their bodily expressions as constant and uniform reactions. Shirley[12] states that every baby expresses one or more fundamental traits. Jung[13] equips every individual with conscious and unconscious basic traits.

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[1] "What is a Trait of Personality," pp. 57 f.

[2] Personality, p. 338. [3] Ibid., p. 337.

[4] Social Psychology, pp. 102 ff. [5] Op. cit., pp. 149 ff.

[6] Personal Traits and Success in Teaching.

[7] Op. cit. [8] Op. cit., pp. 327 ff.

[9] "Educational Status of the Pre-School Child," 497 f. Also, Infancy and Human Growth, p. 164.

[10] Behaviorism, pp. 270 ff.

[11] Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1929), pp. 54 ff.

[12] Op. cit., pp. 45 ff. [13] Op. cit.

Several writers, E. Young,[1] L. Brown,[2] William McDougall,[3] White,[4] and E. Bogardus,[5] elaborate a theory of "balance of personality traits." Every individual possesses pairs of personality traits. In each pair, the traits counterbalance each other (e.g., aggressiveness and submissiveness). The number of pairs that an individual has is not explicitly stated though the generality of the traits is definitely implied.

Many writers have studied particular traits and have concluded that they are general. W. Reckless[6] finds that foster children transfer such traits as quietness, docility, and agreeableness from old to new situations. Emmons[7] secured results that indicate a fairly consistent degree of self-assurance in controlled nursery school situations. He found a few exceptions. He, also, discovered other general traits, namely, interest in detail, self-criticism, and mode of reaction to encountered difficulties. M. Kennedy[8] finds that the rate of speed is expressed consistently in individual performance. L. H. Moore[9] obtained evidence of the generality of leadership traits in college women. H. Pallister[10] finds that the withdrawal attitude in women at Barnard College is a general trait. J. Davies[11] received questionnaire replies from seventy-two seventh grade pupils on the traits of a good teacher. The replies show that kindness, sympathy, humor, and

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[1] "Balance and Imbalance in Personality," Social Attitudes, chap. iv.

[2] Op. cit., p. 639.

[3] Character and the Conduct of Life, pp. 28 ff.

[4] M. O'Shea (ed.), Child: His Nature and His Needs (Valparaiso: Childrens Foundation, 1924), chap. x.

[5] "Balance in Leadership," SSR, XV (1931), 334 ff.

[6] "Case Studies Built Around Observations of Individual Foster-Children in the Playroom of a Receiving Home," PASS, XXIV (1930), 172.

[7] Op. cit., p. 328.

[8] "Speed as a Personality Trait," JSP, I (1930), 291.

[9] "Leadership Traits of College Women," SSR, XVII (1932), 44-54.

[10] "Negative or Withdrawal Attitude," AP, (April, 1933), No. 151.

[11] "What are the Traits of the Good Teacher from the Standpoint of Junior High School Pupils?" SS, XXVIII (1933), 649-652.

fairness are always manifested by good teachers. E. Partridge[1] concludes from his study of adolescent leaders that leadership is a general trait. Paterson[2] establishes inductively the generality of mechanical ability. Kelley[3] names three type traits, namely, social service, dominance, and equilibrium that are consistently manifested. Moore and Gilliland[4] interpret their results on the measurement of aggressiveness as indications of generality though the results indicate specificity in some detail acts. Jersild,[5] Terman,[6] Gates,[7] Woolley,[8] and Burks,[9] consider intelligence a general trait. The generality of special abilities or disabilities is demonstrated by C. Seashore[10] (musical talent), and A. Bronner[11] (language, clerical, visual, mechanical). The generality of temperament is upheld by Shand,[12] J. Bridges,[13] E. Sullivan,[14] H. Cameron,[15] W. I. Thomas,[16] and V. Anderson.[17]

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[1] Leadership Among Adolescent Boys (New York: Columbia University, 1934).

[2] Minnesota Mechanical Ability Tests.

[3] "Oddities in Mental Make-Up." Also, Crossroads in the Mind of Man (Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1928), pp. 17 f.

[4] Op. cit., pp. 97 ff.

[5] Op cit.

[6] Measurement of Intelligence, pp. 114 f.

[7] Op. cit., p. 421.

[8] Op. cit., p. 494.

[9] R. MacIver, Society--Its Structure and Changes (New York: R. Long and R. Smith, 1931), p. 327.

[10] Psychology of Musical Talent (New York: Silver, Burdett and Co., 1919), pp. 6 ff.

[11] "Individual Variations in Mental Equipment," MH, IV (1920), 6 ff.

[12] Op. cit., pp. 129 ff.

[13] "Theories of Temperament: An Attempt at Reconciliation," PR, XXX (1923), 36 ff.

[14] "Mood in Relation to Performance," AP, XXII (1922), No. 53.

[15] Op. cit.

[16] W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, Polish Peasant in Europe and America (New York: A. Knopf, 1927), pp. 1853 f.

[17] "Psychiatric Guide for Employment," JPR, VI (1927), 425.

Generality of some traits.--The writers in this group maintain that some traits are general and that other traits are specific. The universal traits, e.g., "g" factor, perseveration, oscillations of mental efficiency, and self-control, that are described by C. Spearman[1] have the attribute of generality. Other mental activities that he describes are specific factors. These conclusions of Spearman are supported by N. Carey,[2] J. Garnett,[3] E. Webb,[4] and C. Burt,[5] in their own investigations. Hull[6] divides traits into group factors that are general, and activities that are specific. Kitson[7] accepts the generality of intelligence and the specificity of other traits. Similarly, Jersild[8] considers intelligence a general trait, and resistance, negativism, ascendance, submission, confidence, deceit, generosity, and co-operation specific traits. H. Hollingworth[9] refers to the generality of individual traits and specificity of situational traits. F. N. Freeman[10] attributes generality to the traits that belong to will-temperament, emotional temperament, and moral disposition, and specificity to the traits that belong to aesthetic sensibility. Parenthetically, his criteria of generality are an innate basis, and measurability by tests.[11] Ezekiel[12] finds consistency of behavior in egocentric children and specificity of behavior in unagressive children. On the basis of experimental studies, Lois Jack and others[13] conclude that assertiveness and aggressiveness are specific and that the perseverative tendency is general. H. Hunscher, E. Vincent, and I. Macy[14] have evidence of the spec-

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[1] Abilities of Man. [2] Op. cit. [3] Op. cit. [4] Op. cit.

[5] Op. cit. [6] Op. cit., pp. 195 ff. [7] Op. cit., pp. 62 ff.

[8] Op. cit. [9] Judging Human Character, pp. 145 f.

[10] Op. cit.

[11] Generality of a trait is similarly determined by J. Slawson "Reliability of Judgment of Personal Traits," Journal of Applied Psychology, VI (1922), 165. M. Karpf, Scientific Basis of Social Work (New York: Columbia University Press, 1931), pp. 165 f. G. Murphy and L. Murphy, Experimental Social Psychology (New York: Harper and Bros., 1931), p. 604. The last named co-authors find by these criteria that most traits are specific.

[12] Op. cit. [13] Op. cit., p. 9.

[14] "Psychophysiological Studies I. The Technique of Securing Quantitative and Co-ordinated Psychological and Physiological Data on Lactating Women in Their Usual Home Environment," CD, I (1930), 15-28.

ificity of fear, anger, joy, love, worry, and excitement. Despite these findings, they conclude that some traits, e.g., self-control, stability, and good-naturedness are probably general traits. M. Smith[1] who studied Indian student leaders implies the generality of fairness and honesty, and the specificity of other traits, e.g., sportsmanship, friendliness, and pleasantness.

Specificity of traits.--The writers in this group assert either the specificity of all traits or the specificity of particular traits that they have studied.

The viewpoints of Hartshorne, May, Trow, Schwesinger, Hughes, and K. Young were given in the presentation of the definition of personality traits as specific activities. F. Knight and R. Franzen[2] who discuss methods for the elimination of the halo effect practically adopt the specificity theory of Thorndike. I. Wile[3] discovers no generic traits in children and decides that traits of children are specific. H. Woodrow and V. Bemmels[4] make the unsubstantiated statement that there are hundreds of specific traits.

Many writers prove the specificity of particular traits. Filter[5] concludes that an individual's speed of decision varies in different tests. By means of a teaching personality chart, Brubacher[6] shows that leadership in teaching is a specific trait. J. Hoffman[7] proves statistically that overestimation is not a general characteristic. Landis[8] is unsuccessful in his physiological search for a general trait of emotionality. C. Dowd[9] secures mostly low co-efficients of correlation in measurements of speed which convince him of the specificity of the trait. H. Stur-

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[1] "Comparative Study of Indian Student Leaders and Followers," SF, XIII (1935), 418 ff.

[2] "Pitfalls in Rating Schemes," JEP, XIII (1922), 204-213.

[3] Op. cit.

[4] "Overstatement as a Test of General Character in Pre-School Children," JEP, XVIII (1927), 239-246.

[5] Op. cit. [6] Op. cit.

[7] "An Experiment in Self-estimation," JAP, XVIII (1923), 43 ff.

[8] Op. cit.

[9] "Study of the Consistency of Rate of Work," AP, XIII (1926), No. 84.

ges[1] finds that tests of the trait, consistency, point to its specificity. W. Cowley[2] concludes that leaders do not act consistently in all situations. L. Waid[3] compares the ratings of teachers by their principals and supervisors. The decided differences in ratings support the specificity of the teachers' traits. J. Maller[4] who uses "The Self-Marking Test" obtains results in favor of the specificity of honesty. F. Shuttleworth,[5] in an independent study, confirms the specificity of honesty. O. Held[6] reaches the conclusion that honesty, fairness, selfishness, perseverance, and domination show often a lack of consistency. They are, therefore, bundles of specific habits rather than single traits. W. Root[7] notices frequently that the man who is liberal in one situation is conservative in another situation or radical in a third situation. F. Wells[8] who studied and used questionnaires shows that traits are given as specific reactions in most questionnaires. J. Almack[9] obtains negative evidence of the consistency of an individual's humor. D. McCarthy[10] and R. Pearson[11] who tested separately the hypothesis of Piaget regarding the egocentrism of children reach the conclusion that a child's conduct is highly specific.

Specificity or generality of traits.--Dewey,[12] and Faris[13]

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[1]"Theory of Correlation Applied in Studies of Changing Attitudes," AJS, XXXIII (1927), 269-275.

[2]"Three Distinctions in the Study of Leadership," JAP, XXIII (1928), 144 ff.

[3]"The Rating of Teachers in Service," Master's thesis, Department of Education, University of Chicago, 1930.

[4]Op. cit. [5]"Integration of Character," ICP, p. 398.

[6]"Habit Formation and Hygiene," CD, IV (1933), 346-357.

[7]"Psychology of Radicalism," JAP, XIX (1924), 341.

[8]"Report on a Questionnaire Study of Personality Traits with a College Graduate Group," MH, IX (1925), 127.

[9]"Nature of Humor," Century, CXVI (1928), 561.

[10]"Comparison of Children's Language in Different Situations and Its Relation to Personality Traits," PS, XXXVI (1929), 583 ff.

[11]"Preschool Personality Research," AJS, XXXVI (1931),594.

[12]Human Nature and Conduct, p. 75.

[13]"Standpoint and Methods, etc.," p. 2.

who relate traits to group expectations of conduct think that traits can be either general or specific depending upon the group memberships that an individual has. D. Laird[1] has a test of introversion and extroversion that represents the traits in degrees. Theoretically, a person can manifest specificity or generality in these traits. In the tests that E. Shen[2] uses, he subscribes implicitly to the generality and specificity of the trait, self-estimation. E. Young[3] bases the generality of traits upon the nature of social organizations. For instance, honesty and intelligence are probably general traits in rural communities but specific traits in urban areas. Anderson[4] relates the specificity and generality of traits respectively to changing and constant social environments. Blatz and Bott[5] describe some nursery school children who are consistently quiet or aggressive, and others whose conduct can never be foreseen.[6] Similarly, King[7] refers to children who are always trustworthy or untrustworthy, and others who are exceedingly variable. Goodenough[8] accounts for the consistency of conduct by broad factors in the general environment. She endorses strongly, however, the viewpoint of Hartshorne and May on the specificity of traits. Curti[9] accepts without question the conclusions of G. Allport (generality of traits) and Hartshorne (specificity of traits). Sherman[10] believes that traits are specific in complex environments and general in simple, homogeneous environments.

Tendency toward generality of traits.--This group of writers cannot be sharply demarcated from the preceding group. Bogardus[11] discloses tendencies toward consistent actions though

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[1]Colgate Tests of Emotional Outlets (Hamilton, New York: Hamilton Republican, 1925).

[2]"Validity of Self-Estimate," JEP, XVI (1925), 104 ff.

[3]"What Type of Personality Should Be the Goal of Social Case Work," SSR, XVIII (1933), 126.

[4]Unconscious-A Symposium, pp. 79 f. [5]Op. cit., pp. 232 ff.

[6]They do not adhere consistently to this position.

[7]Op. cit., pp. 525 ff. [8]Developmental Psychology.

[9]Child Psychology. [10]Development of Attitudes.

[11]"Leadership and Social Situations."

deviations are occasionally noticed in racial attitudes, personal behavior patterns, and leadership. W. Rand, M. Sweeny, and E. Vincent[1] after they describe the introvert and extrovert traits in an individual state that an individual manifests usually a stronger tendency toward one or the other type. Barker[2] characterizes personalities by their dominant trends but adds that divergencies always exist. Prince[3] refers to the specificity of traits in conflict situations but defines traits as habitual or characteristic behavior. In case studies, he discusses usually the general trends of behavior.

Attitudes of writers to the generality or specificity of traits will now be described from the standpoint of the development of conduct. They are classified into two major groups. In the first group, development is from specific traits to general traits. In the second group, development is from general conduct to specific conduct. No detail attention will be given to the processes that are involved.

Specific to general.--H. Garrett,[4] D. Leary,[5] Curti,[6] Watson,[7] Anderson,[8] E. Kempf,[9] E. Vincent,[10] L. Bernard,[11] K. Young,[12] G. Allport,[13] F. Allport,[14] Perrin and Klein[15] explain the integration of specific activities or traits by the conditioning of stimuli and responses. They differ with one another, however, in the detail formulation of their theories.

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[1] Growth and Development of the Young Child (Philadelphia: W. Saunders Co., 1934).

[2] Op. cit., p. 90. [3] Op. cit. [4] Op. cit., pp. 251 ff.

[5] Educational Psychology (New York: T. Nelson and Sons, 1934).

[6] Op. cit., p. 499. [7] Op. cit., pp. 270 ff.

[8] Op. cit., pp. 75 f.

[9] Autonomic Functions and the Personality (New York: Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co., 1921), pp. 139 f..

[10] "Personality Problems Before Seven," CE (April, 1931), pp. 415 ff.

[11] Op. cit., pp. 269 ff. [12] Social Psychology, p. 89.

[13] "Concepts of Trait and Personality," p. 289. In Personality, chap. v, he subscribes to a differentiation within an integrated pattern.

[14] Social Psychology. [15] Op cit., p. 76.

Gates,[1] Voelker,[2] Jersild,[3] Valentine,[4] R. McDougall,[5] E. Sisson,[6] and Blatz and Bott[7] explain the organization of conduct by an individual's participation in many similar, specific habits. A child gradually sees the common elements in his activities, and subsequently, principles of consistent conduct emerge.

Shand,[8] William McDougall,[9] and Prince,[10] employ the concept of sentiment in their explanations of organized conduct. Sentiment is the integration of emotions around an object. It develops through modification of instinctive impulses; pains and pleasures or rewards and punishments; anticipations of social praise and blame; and acquisition of ideals.

General to specific.--According to Wheeler and Perkins,[11] the history of any behavior pattern is as follows.

> The pattern as a whole, at the outset, exhibits simplicity of form and heterogeneity of action (unpredictable, so-called random activity). In the end it exhibits complexity of form (heterogeneity) and simplicity of action (predictable).[12]

These co-authors assume the existence of a general pattern of behavior in the infant's personality that pervades the specific actions of later life. In the investigation of childhood behavior patterns, Anderson[13] perceives practically no differentiation in the baby's responses during the first month. Thereafter, the differentiation of distinct reactions is noticeable in successive observations. He notes also the integration of some activities.[14]

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[1] Op. cit., pp. 297 ff. [2] Op. cit., pp. 31 ff.

[3] Op. cit., p. 367. [4] Op. cit., pp. 206 f.

[5] Op. cit., p. 733.

[6] "Process of Moral Development," SS, XXII (1925), 712.

[7] Op. cit., pp. 270 f. [8] Op. cit., pp. 21 ff.

[9] Op. cit., pp. 121 ff.

[10] "The Structure and Dynamic Elements of Human Personality," JAP, XV (1920), 409 ff.

[11] They apply gestalt principles to personality traits. K. Koffka makes a few general applications to personality but none to traits ("Psychical and Physical Structures," Psyche, V [1924], 81).

[12] Op. cit., p. 463. [13] Op. cit., 72 ff.

[14] The alternation of differentiation and integration in the development of conduct is present in many writings. See for instance the works of Dewey, Goodenough, Valentine, and others.

In a theoretical work, A. Weiss[1] states that the limitless differentiation of responses in adulthood proceed from a few relatively simple reactions in childhood. Although he admits the influence of early actions upon later behavior, he attaches most significance to later experiences in the explanation of recent behavior. Shirley[2] refers to (unnamed) general patterns of behavior of infancy that are noticeable in the differentiated traits of later years. K. Bridges[3] says that the earliest emotional response in a child is a general agitation or excitement. From this general pattern, specific emotional behavior develops. For instance, emotional distress appears at the end of the third week. Later, the emotion of delight is noticeable, etc. L. Hohman[4] describes several life patterns (the tendency toward repetition in life) that start from general reaction patterns in childhood. Each pattern can be altered by conditioning but the influence of the early behavior pattern is never obliterated. Goodenough[5] mentions the studies of Irwin, Pratt, Nelson, and Sun as evidence of the development of behavior from the general to the specific. In a later chapter, she writes affirmatively, however, about the integration of traits without reference to this previous statement. According to Bühler,[6] the infant's behavior before the sixth month is predominantly flight movements. Thereafter, it is characterized by activity or passivity. In the matured person, reactions are neither simply positive nor negative, but are complicated by pleasure, displeasure, sympathy, antipathy and the like. The basic pattern of childhood is, however, observable in these specific traits. Blatz and Bott[7] trace confidence, assurance, and mastery to the basic attitude of approach, and submission, inadequacy, and inferiority to

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[1] Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior (Columbus: R. Adams and Co., 1929), pp. 101 ff.

[2] Op. cit., pp. 45 ff.

[3] "Emotional Development in Early Infancy," CD, III (1932), 324 ff.

[4] "Formation of Life Patterns," MH, XI (1927), 23 ff.

[5] Op. cit., pp. 123 ff. [6] Op. cit., pp. 16 ff.

[7] Op. cit., pp. 245 ff.

the basic attitude of withdrawal.[1] Burgess[2] and Adler[3] maintain that a basic trait dominates in each individual all of his later traits.

Several writers mention specific traits that emerge from general traits though they do not indicate whether the general traits exist from early childhood. For instance, Kempf[4] enumerates shame, sorrow, disgust, anxiety, anguish, sadness, jealousy, pity and meekness as manifestations of fear. W. Chambers[5] sketches the development of selfishness from altruism. William McDougall[6] gives forms of egotism that originate from a basic pattern of egotism.

Besides these two major attitudes on the development of conduct, there are extreme viewpoints that merit mention. Spearman and Hull imply a constant generality respectively for universal and group factors. The same implication exists in the attitudes of Gesell, Terman, Seashore, and Bronner on the traits of general and special abilities. On the other extreme, Hartshorne, May,[7] and Shuttleworth[8] state explicitly that traits are seldom integrated. They are usually specific activities.

The evaluation of the answers to this problem of specificity will begin with a consideration of the denotations of generality and specificity. Do the writers (Adler, Bühler, Burgess, Wickman, Royce) who speak of one basic trait mean that an individual acts identically everywhere? In all probability, they do not because they refer to other traits that signify more accurately than the basic trait an individual's differential activity in situations. They do imply at least partial resemblances among an individual's actions because they speak of the generality of the basic trait.

What do writers (G. Allport, F. Allport, Garrett, Gilli-

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[1]They do not relate this statement to their previous remarks on integration.

[2]See pp. 98 ff. [3]See pp. 99 ff. [4]Op. cit., pp. 79 ff.

[5]"Evolution of Ideals," PS, X (1903), 106 ff.

[6]Character and the Conduct of Life, pp. 208 ff.

[7]See pp. 108 ff.

[8]"Integration of Character," ICP, pp. 394 f.

land) who name several basic traits mean by generality? G. Allport and to some extent F. Allport mean by consistency, equivalent responses rather than stereotyped or uniform habits. Inconsistent activities as judged by external actions are internally congruent because they probably spring from the same root.[1] Garrett and Gilliland mean probably the identical expression of a trait in each situation that it appears. Although no single basic trait appears in all situations, a basic trait is expressed in every situation. Among all four of these writers, the generality of a trait is less extensive than in the preceding viewpoint.

There are other disagreements on the nature of generality. For Adler, Freud, and Burgess, generality results from social experiences. For G. Allport and F. Allport, generality is a product of neural organization. Gesell conceives of generality as an expression of physiological maturation. Spearman thinks that generality indicates organically inherited behavior. Kennedy bases generality upon the agreement of test results. Reckless says that generality involves the transfer of activities. Gates, Curti, and Edman exclude the transfer of habits but include the integration of activities in their conceptions of generality.

What are the denotations of specificity? Some writers (Hartshorne, May, Trow, Maller) signify by specificity the uniqueness of conduct in every situation. A. Meiklejohn[2] has sharply criticized interpretations of this kind. Other writers (Filter, Dowd, Waid, Held) mean by specificity the unlikeness of actions to one another without denying similarities.

There are also other disagreements on the nature of specificity. Thorndike thinks that specificity denotes neurological activities that have no identical cortical cells. Hull identifies specificity with variability. Anderson relates specificity to conflicting social environments of an individual. Hartshorne infers specificity from the disagreements in test results. Woodrow implies that specificity is a function of complex activity.

Not only have writers disagreed on the denotations of generality and specificity, but also, they have made concessions to opposing viewpoints. Among the adherents to generality, acknowl-

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[1] Personality, pp. 303 footnote; 317; 319; 330-340; 357; 314-316; 428; 478 footnote.

[2] "Is Mental Training a Myth?" ER, XXXVII (1908), 126 ff.

edgments of specificity or less generality of behavior have been made in the following ways. Burgess mentions personality traits besides the individual's basic trait. Adler has recourse to character traits in the description of an individual's life pattern. Freud includes the rivalry of behavior as a fundamental tenet of his theory. F. Allport lists sub-traits under the five fundamental traits. In one article, he discredits the use of certain traits, e.g., independence of thought, decisiveness, lack of sympathy and understanding of others, aggressiveness, and confidence because they are intangible generalizations. He thinks that the observation of an individual's behavior in specific situations is necessary because general trait descriptions "tell the individual little about himself."[1] Downey analyzes temperament into speed, forcefulness, carefulness and other traits. Shirley resolves basic patterns into specific acts. G. Allport acknowledges the existence of specific activities which he calls attitudes.[2] and the multiplicity of motives[3] which suggests the existence of many traits. In one place, he makes the statement that "there are all possible degrees of organization in a trait from the most circumscribed and unstable to the most pervasive and most firmly integrated."[4]

Among the upholders of specificity, admissions are also made of generality or less specificity of behavior. Thorndike sees a usefulness for general terms like reasoning and concentration. Knight and Franzen imply generality of behavior in their criticism of the halo effect. Woodrow and Bemmels suggest generality of conduct in their reference to the complexity of specific traits. Dowd secures positive co-efficients of correlation which indicate the generality of speed in a few individuals. Held refers to selfishness, perseverance and other traits as bundles of specific habits, but habits that are bundled into selfishness, for instance, have surely a common attribute. Hartshorne and May mention some cases that show consistent conduct though they deny that these cases represent empirical organizations of character.

Further evidences of implicit concessions, at least, are present in the attitudes on the development of conduct.

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[1] "Self-Evaluation, etc.," p. 571.

[2] Personality, pp. 293 f. and 341.

[3] Ibid., p. 520. [4] Ibid., p. 338.

Theoretically, most writers who have been cited on the development of conduct should accept the generality and specificity of traits. Actually, only a few (e.g., Curti, Goodenough, and Anderson) do. G. Allport who defines a trait as integrated neural behavior does not consider the specific behavior before integrations. Hence, he accepts only the generality of traits. It would be helpful if he stated the degree of integration that is necessary before a trait exists. Watson posits many specific activities which are integrated into general habits. Although he supports only the generality of traits, specificity inheres in his theory.[1] K. Young who accepts specificity of traits accounts for habit systems through the integration of specific activities. Surely habit systems represent the generality of traits. Similarly, Jersild supports the specificity of traits (except intelligence) but he recognizes the organization of behavior patterns.. On the other hand, Wheeler and Perkins, Bühler, Shirley, Bridges, Hohman, and others insist solely upon the generality of traits though they trace the development of specific actions or traits from general patterns.

These concessions by adherents to specificity or generality of traits suggest that both aspects probably exist in an individual. Some writers (Spearman and Hull) have demonstrated the generality of some traits and the specificity of other traits in an individual. Other writers (Dewey and Faris) have given social psychological explanations for the generality or specificity of any trait in an individual.

Divergent answers to the problems of specificity or generality and mutability or permanency might be fewer if the relations between these problems were better understood. At present, permanency is identified with generality of trait by G. Allport, F. Allport, Hollingworth, Spearman, Paterson, Kitson, Schwesinger, Brandenburg, Bühler, Shirley, and others. Mutability is identified with specificity of trait by Hartshorne, May, Shuttleworth, Trow, P. Young, W. Hughes, Landis, Dowd, Wile, Kennedy,and others. All writers do not make, however, these identifications. For instance, Freeman, Wickman, Gilliland, Prince, and Overstreet speak of changes in dominant patterns or general traits. Thorndike,

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[1]This applies to most writers who assume that general traits originate in early social experiences.

K. Young, Knight, and Franzen refer to the permanency of specific activities. Hohman, Shirley, Blatz and Bott describe the mutability of specific traits within a permanent, general pattern of behavior. Cannon, Howard and Patry write about permanent specific traits which form general behavior patterns that change. Spearman, Kelley, Hull, Garnett, and others combine in one theory the identification of permanency with generality in certain traits and mutability with specificity in other traits. Dewey, Faris, Wirth and others recognize that a trait can be general and permanent; general and changeable; specific and permanent; or specific and mutable.

The identification of permanency with generality and mutability with specificity can easily occur because time is involved in activities, and a person does usually one thing at a time. Consequently, new conduct indicates simultaneously changed and specific activity. Old conduct indicates simultaneously permanent and general activity. Accordingly, there is justification for these identifications which some writers make. It should only be remembered that the associations are not inevitable.

Few writers have given verbal recognition to the relations between these two major problems. For the most part, the viewpoints of writers must be inferred. Until these problems are accurately discerned, there can be no distinct thought on either one. Furthermore, most writers have unintentionally separated these two problems from other problems of personality traits, and therefore they have not realized the implications of their statements on these other problems for the mutability or specificity of personality traits.

SUMMARY

At present, little attention is centered upon the nature of personality trait apart from these four major attributes. From many writings it can be inferred that activity or action denotes a personality trait. The activity is, however, usually defined in terms of one or more of the four major attributes. The writers who relate personality traits to group expectations are especially cognizant of the denotation of the concept aside from these four characteristics. There is a partial recognition of the relation between standards and traits regardless of permanence, mutability, specificity, or generality among those who measure traits by rating scales. Significant contributions to the general knowledge about traits have been made without careful consideration of the concept of personality trait. Organized knowledge on traits, however, could be more readily achieved if the definition of personality trait were not considered a perfunctory matter. A definition of personality trait that is universally accepted cannot be expected. Antecedent concepts of personality trait never had unanimous acceptance, and, at present, definitions of personality are too divergent. A writer who stresses physical personality has inevitably a different conception of personality trait than a writer who emphasizes social personality.

In presentations of evidences for or against mutability and specificity, many writers are not always aware of the inapplicability of their data to some viewpoints. This is especially true of the viewpoints that express certain definitions of personality trait. For instance, evidence for mutability does not disprove the permanence of traits in the theories that restrict personality traits to permanent conduct. Such theories are given by writers who endorse the mutability of non-personality trait conduct. Systematized knowledge on personality traits can be more easily developed when writers state definitely their conception of personality trait, problem of research (e.g., whether mutability or specificity), and the viewpoint that they have refuted.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AJO, American Journal of Orthopsychiatry
AJP, American Journal of Psychology
AJS, American Journal of Sociology
ANP, Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry
AP, Archives of Psychology
APSR, American Political Science Review
BJP, British Journal of Psychology
BJPMS, British Journal of Psychology, Monograph Supplement
CD, Child Development
CE, Childhood Education
EAS, Educational Administration and Supervision
ER, Educational Review
GPM, Genetic Psychology, Monograph
ICP, International Congress of Psychology
IP, Industrial Psychology
JAP, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology
JAS, Journal of Applied Sociology
JD, Journal of Delinquency
JEE, Journal of Experimental Education
JEP, Journal of Educational Psychology
JER, Journal of Educational Research
JES, Journal of Educational Sociology
JGP, Journal of Genetic Psychology
JNEA, Journal of the National Education Association
JP, Journal of Philosophy
JPPsM, Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods
JPR, Journal of Personnel Research
JSP, Journal of Social Psychology
MH, Mental Hygiene
NCSW, National Conference of Social Work
PASS, Publications of the American Sociological Society
PB, Psychological Bulletin
PC, Psychological Clinic
PJ, Personnel Journal
PM, Psychological Monographs
PR, Psychological Review
PS, Pedagogical Seminary
PSM, Popular Science Monthly
RER, Review of Educational Research
RST, Rev. de la Sci. du Trav.
SF, Social Forces
SM, Scientific Monthly
SR, School Review
SS, School and Society
SSR, Sociology and Social Research
VG, Vocational Guidance
ZAP, Zeitschrift für Angewandte Psychologie
ZP, Zeitschrift für Psychologie
ZPPEP, Zeitschrift für Pädagofrische Psychologie und Experimentelle Pädogogik